

Motivation

- Risks spike in China's financial system, especially for local government indebtedness
 - Local governments have accumulated too much leverage
 - Approximately 24 trillion RMB, 37.22% of GDP in 2014
- Government debt becomes a serious issue worldwide
 - Credit from Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) has been growing rapidly
 - Looming concerns on default risks; The U.S. (e.g., Puerto Rico), The E.U. (e.g., Greece)
- Important to understand the patterns of debt issuance and default
 - How do these loans default
 - Most of them are off-balance sheet
 - No consensus on even the amount of local government debt in China

Contribution

- This paper use a unique loan-level data to unveil the local governments off-balance sheet debt in China
 - Trace each loan to document stylized facts cross regions and overtime
- Development bank loans perform better than commercial bank loans
 - Against conventional wisdom (e.g., Stiglitz (1993), La Porta et al. (2002), Barone and Spratt (2015))
 - Prevalent in many other countries recently
 - New Channel: Selective default strategy; distressed local governments choose to default on commercial bank loans
- Role of politician career concerns (e.g., Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000))
 - Development bank loans amount is positively associated with promotion chances of politicians
 - Relationship banking play a role (e.g., Boot (2000), Petersen and Rajan (1994))
 - Better loan performance in later years in politicians' terms, especially for development banks

Tax Sharing Reform and Budget Law

- Tax Sharing Reform in 1994
 - Local governments in China receive only around 30% of the tax revenue
- Budget Law in 1994 prohibited local government to incur debts
 - Local governments can't directly borrow or issue bonds until 2015
- Local governments are still responsible for local economic development
 - For example, infrastructure investments
- Huge gap between local government investment and financing

Off-Balance Sheet Borrowing

- The China Development Bank (CDB) was established in 1994
 - The CDB is a policy bank with mandate to provide subsidized credit to infrastructure investments and to strategic industries
- The CDB help local governments to set up local government financing vehicles (LGFVs)
 - LGFVs are fully state-owned corporations which can legally borrow and issue bonds
 - Wuhu Model in 1998; first LGFV.
 - All of local government debts are off-balance sheet until 2015.
- LGFVs have various financing sources
 - Borrow from the CDB and commercial banks
 - Issue bonds
 - Borrow from shadow banking system


CBRC Loan-level Data

- The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) records information on all bank loans
 - The CBRC data set includes all loans from 19 largest banks (2 policy banks and 17 commercial banks)
 - Cover borrowers with an annual credit line over RMB 50 million (approximately US\$8 million) between 2007 and 2013
 - Cover approximately 80% of the total bank credit in China
 - Record comprehensive loan level information (e.g., loan amount, maturity, guarantee, ratings, delinquency) as well as firm characteristics (e.g., ID, assets, location)
- List of local government financing vehicles from the CBRC
 - There are 5,672 LGFVs that have loan information covered by the loan data set

Regional Distribution (Loan to GDP Ratio) in 2012

Bank Lending to LGFVs

Default Patterns (Over 90 Days Delinquency)



The CDB vs. Commercial Banks

Panel A: Commercial Banks versus China Development Bank

	Obs.	Default Rate	Obs.	Default Rate
	LFGVs		Non-LFGVs	
Commercial Banks	83,948	1.8%	5,226,036	0.9%
CDB	5,837	0.3%	7,658	0.9%
Mean Diff		1.5%***		-0.0%
<i>T</i> -statistics		18.41		-0.32
<i>Wilcoxon rank sum test Z</i> -statistics		8.89		-0.17

The CDB vs. Commercial Banks

	Default Probability			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CDB	-1.843*** (-7.09)	-2.570*** (-9.45)	-2.757*** (-9.77)	-2.852*** (-10.06)
Bank Loan Rating		1.194*** (19.03)	1.141*** (17.72)	1.078*** (16.37)
Loan Size		6.982*** (15.98)	6.675*** (14.74)	6.750*** (14.68)
Maturity		-0.083*** (-2.85)	-0.050 (-1.62)	-0.054* (-1.74)
Guaranteed		0.131** (2.27)	0.164*** (2.76)	0.176*** (2.96)
Log(LGFV Assets)		-0.173*** (-9.12)	-0.190*** (-9.60)	-0.184*** (-8.92)
LGFV Leverage		-0.003 (-0.45)	-0.002 (-0.41)	-0.004 (-0.64)
Log(Local GDP)				0.144*** (3.70)
Local Expense/Revenue				0.088*** (5.42)
Local Estate Invest/GDP				-3.838*** (-5.97)
Local Corruption				0.205*** (4.07)
Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. Obs.	89,785	88,623	88,360	88,355
Pseudo. R2	0.007	0.043	0.054	0.060

Better Loan Performance of the CDB

- In contrast with the conventional wisdom
 - Policy banks should perform poorly because they do not focus on (short-term) profits and usually invest in undeveloped areas and in non-profitable public goods with positive externalities
- Only for loans to LGFVs but not for regular loans
- Very robust results
 - Matched loan characteristics
- The question is How and Why?

Selective Default Strategy

Table 4: Selective Default across Banks

	Default Probability			
	Government Selecting		LGFV Selecting	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CDB	-2.390*** (-8.28)	-2.530*** (-8.77)	-1.618*** (-4.25)	-1.671*** (-4.38)
Bank Loan Rating	1.242*** (16.07)	0.987*** (12.05)	0.154 (0.36)	0.110 (0.25)
Loan Size	5.706*** (10.39)	6.354*** (11.47)	7.083*** (4.98)	6.786*** (4.76)
Maturity	-0.074** (-2.03)	-0.055 (-1.51)	0.078 (0.72)	0.051 (0.46)
Guaranteed	-0.035 (-0.53)	0.077 (1.13)	-0.500** (-2.23)	-0.522** (-2.27)
Log(LGFV Assets)	-0.310*** (-13.93)	-0.261*** (-11.05)	-0.705*** (-7.99)	-0.742*** (-7.81)
LGFV Leverage	-0.016** (-2.03)	-0.011 (-1.39)	-0.063*** (-5.31)	-0.067*** (-5.47)
Control	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
No. Obs.	46,732	46,732	2,373	2,373
Pseudo. R2	0.069	0.092	0.120	0.123

Why local government choose to NOT default on the CDB?

Career Concerns

Table 5: Access to CDB Credit and Politician Promotion

	Politician Promotion			
	Rank Based		Rank Plus GDP Based	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(CDB Loan)	0.319*** (3.01)		0.256*** (2.71)	
CDB/Total Loan		0.313* (1.93)		0.322** (2.25)
Male	-0.601 (-1.59)	-0.603 (-1.60)	0.145 (0.40)	0.124 (0.34)
Age>=50	-1.095*** (-5.37)	-1.105*** (-5.46)	-0.645*** (-3.73)	-0.659*** (-3.82)
Local Politician	-0.120 (-0.54)	-0.130 (-0.58)	0.242 (1.29)	0.225 (1.21)
High Education	1.598 (1.50)	1.562 (1.48)	1.683** (2.21)	1.674** (2.20)
Oversea Experience	-0.309 (-0.95)	-0.319 (-0.97)	-0.324 (-1.19)	-0.318 (-1.16)
Log(Local GDP)	0.064 (0.40)	0.248* (1.67)	-0.014 (-0.10)	0.151 (1.17)
Local Expense/Revenue	-0.035 (-0.51)	-0.085 (-1.21)	-0.024 (-0.47)	-0.053 (-1.03)
Tertiary sector/GDP	0.023* (1.80)	0.033*** (2.68)	0.006 (0.55)	0.015 (1.40)
Year Fixed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. Obs.	657	657	657	657
Pseudo. R2	0.122	0.110	0.053	0.046

Political Cycle and Default


Table 6: Political Cycle Effect on Relationship between Loan Default and Lending Bank Type

	Default Probability			
	Within one year prior to turnover		Within two years prior to turnover	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CDB	-2.528*** (-7.41)	-2.735*** (-7.89)	-2.317*** (-6.04)	-2.550*** (-6.56)
CDB*Politician Turnover	-0.273* (-1.88)	-0.360* (-1.74)	-0.569* (-1.65)	-0.587* (-1.79)
Politician Turnover	0.075 (1.11)	0.041 (0.18)	-0.042 (-0.71)	-0.057 (-0.95)
Male	0.174 (0.79)	0.298 (1.34)	0.188 (0.85)	0.307 (1.38)
Age \geq 50	0.133** (2.08)	0.121* (1.87)	0.128** (2.00)	0.118* (1.83)
High Education	-0.442*** (-3.79)	-0.346*** (-2.88)	-0.425*** (-3.66)	-0.335*** (-2.81)
Oversea Experience	-0.257** (-2.24)	-0.344*** (-2.94)	-0.263** (-2.29)	-0.349*** (-2.99)
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
No. Obs.	68,750	68,750	68,750	68,750
Pseudo. R2	0.051	0.064	0.051	0.063

Why Politicians Don't Want To Default on the CDB

- Compared with commercial banks, the CDB was at the ministerial level
- The CDB has closer relationship with local governments
 - Many of CDB employees are from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
- The CDB is more important for LGFVs since they provide long-term and stable funds
- We exploit two policy shocks of four trillion stimulus packages
 - Officially started on Nov 2008
 - Sudden pull back on June 2010

Bank Lending over Four Trillion: New Loan Issuance



Selective Default and Relationship

Table 8: Selective Default and Two Policy Shocks of Four Trillion Stimulus Package

	Default Probability	
	(1)	(2)
CDB	-0.136*** (-7.55)	-0.210** (-2.22)
CDB*4-trillion Package	0.047** (2.01)	0.134 (0.97)
CDB*Tightening Regulation	-0.045** (-2.18)	-0.112* (-1.92)
4-trillion Package	0.004 (0.37)	0.064 (1.11)
Tightening Regulation	0.007 (0.65)	0.100 (1.50)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
No. Obs.	46,732	2,373
Pseudo. R2	0.094	0.135

Conclusion

- Local government debt in China
 - E.g., Ang, Bai, and Zhou (2016 WP); Bolton (2016 AFA)
- Value of relationship banking
 - Cross-default vs. Selective-default
- Political economy of bank lending
 - E.g., Sapienza (2004 JF), Dinc (2005 JFE), Khwaja and Mian (2005 QJE), Calvalho (2014 JF), Ru (2017 JF)
- China Model/Chinese Characteristics
 - E.g., Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005 JFE); Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011 AER); Bailey, Huang, and Yang (2011 JFQA); Chen, He, and Liu (WP)