# Panda Games: Corporate Disclosure in the Eclipse of Search

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
**ABFER 2018** 


#### Cut off China from the rest of the world



Qianlong emperor Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)

# Single commerce port in 1757: foreigners can only trade in Guangzhou






 $Source: "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per \ Capita \ GDP, 1-2008 \ AD", \\ Angus \ Maddison, University of Groningen.$ 

# Wei Zexi (魏则西)


A 21-year old Chinese college student from Shaanxi was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer in 2014



百度一下








This hospital claimed that they had immunotherapy treatments collaborated with Standford University

Zexi passed away in 2016 and the government imposed an investigation on Baidu

#### 1. Motivation



#### **Question:**

Does the search-based information transmission help investors monitor firms?

## 2. Design

If investors can not search for information, how would firms react to it? e.g. corporate disclosure?

Our experiment:


Google's 2010 exit from Mainland China



## 3. Hypothesis

#### Intuition:

Impede domestic investors' search for foreign information



## **Hypothesis:**

After Google's 2010 exit, firms should issue overoptimistic press releases involving foreign events

## 4. Preview of our findings


- a. After Google's exit from China,
  - firms' press releases on their foreign events become more optimistic
  - firms with existing foreign operations issue more bullish annual reports and have smaller price nonsynchronicity
- b. The presence of foreign investors and foreign analysts can mitigate the above effect, while the result is more pronounced for firms with a large fraction of retail investors
- c. More frequent and profitable insider sales after a press release (annual report)

# 5.1 Google versus Bai 面實


Google entered Mainland China in 2006 after agreeing upon abiding by China's censorship rules

- Google.cn
- Competes directly with Baidu.com


Those who need domestic information should go to Baidu, and those who need foreign information should go to Google




## Baidu and Google's Market Share in China




## Search volumes of key words in Baidu and Google






#### Baidu's search quality of foreign information

#### Type "Massimo Massa" in Google



#### Baidu's search quality of foreign information

#### Type "Massimo Massa" in Baidu



# 5.2 Measuring sentiment in corporate disclosure

## 1) *Tone*

*Tone* = (# of positive words - # of negative words)/words in a press release and multiplied by 10,000.

#### 2) Sentiment

Words are grouped into six sentiment categories

- 1:超 (super)
- 2: 极其 (extreme) 、最(most)
- 3: 很 (very)
- 4: 较 (more)
- 5:稍 (-ish)
- 6: 欠 (insufficiently)


Sentiment = (# of words in 1-4-# of words in 5-6)/words


#### 5.3 Sample

- 1) Extract press releases from 2007 to 2014
  - A sample firm with both domestic and foreign press releases around the event
- 2) End up with 11,865 press releases issued by 633 firms
  - 4,334 releases are about foreign events
  - 7,531 are related only to domestic events

Event Type	Foreign Event	Domestic Event	# of obs.
Asset restructuring	417	657	1,074
Major contract	343	464	807
Borrowing	54	109	163
Collateral and guarantees	711	1,240	1,951
Project investment	910	1,646	2,556
Related party transaction	846	1,145	1,991
Fund raising	486	923	1,409
Other financing	567	1,347	1,914
Total	4,334	7,531	11,865

# 6.1 Univariate analysis





#### 6.2 Multivariate regression

$$Tone_{i,t}(Sentiment_{i,t}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Foreign Event_{i,t} \times Google Exit + \beta_2 Foreign Event_{i,t} + \beta_3 Google Exit + B_4 X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Following Google's exit, the tone of a corporate press release regarding a foreign event is 13.69 % higher than that for a similar domestic event, relative to the sample mean.

Dependent Variable	Te	ne	Senti	ment
Foreign Event × Google Exit	0.479**	0.500**	1.985**	2.222*
	(2.11)	(2.07)	(2.02)	(1.93)
Foreign Event	0.274*	0.321**	1.621***	1.759***
	(1.91)	(2.16)	(4.17)	(4.48)
Google Exit	-0.109*	-0.235**	-0.138	-0.648
	(-1.75)	(-2.46)	(-1.10)	(-1.49)
Size		0.094**		0.388*
		(2.26)		(1.78)
Book to Market		-0.048**		-0.046
		(-2.14)		(-0.41)
Age		-0.231		0.123
		(-1.05)		(0.17)
ROA		0.521		1.347
		(1.28)		(0.86)
SOE		0.025		-0.708
		(0.29)		(-1.05)
Big 4 Auditor		-0.022		-0.003
		(-0.42)		(-0.02)
Event Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
# of obs.	11,865	11,865	11,865	11,865
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.082	0.312	0.084	0.285

## 6.3 Alternative access to foreign information

# Role of foreign investors They are not subject to the censorship of foreign information

	Wit	With QFII		ut QFII
Dependent Variable	Tone	Sentiment	Tone	Sentiment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Event × Google Exit	0.188 (0.65)	1.530 (1.07)	0.710*** (2.71)	2.886** (2.08)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	1,784	1,784	1,784	1,784
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.409	0.354	0.450	0.424

# • Effect of analysts affiliated with foreign brokers Foreign brokers have operations outside Mainland China

	Covered by Analysts from Foreign Brokers		Covered by A Domestic	•
Dependent Variable	Tone	Sentiment	Tone	Sentiment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Event × Google Exit	0.004	0.209	0.008***	0.342*
	(1.00)	<b>(1.26)</b>	(4.36)	(1.87)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	1,635	1,635	1,635	1,635
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.411	0.377	0.512	0.434

# 6.3 Alternative access to foreign information

# Role of retail investors Compared to institutional investors, Google searches are mostly used by individuals

	Low Reta	Low Retail Ownership		l Ownership
Dependent Variable	Tone	Sentiment	Tone	Sentiment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Event × Google Exit	0.407	1.804	0.614**	2.571**
	(1.34)	(1.46)	(2.54)	(2.09)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	5,777	5,777	5,799	5,799
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.323	0.308	0.358	0.336

#### 6.4 Placebo test

Concern: the above result could be driven by a time trend effect or other economic, financial, and regulatory events

#### Solution:

- Randomly select 200 days between 2007 and 2014 as the (false)
   Google's exit date
- Run 200 regressions to test Foreign Event × Google Exit

	Google's actual exit date	Mean	5%	25%	Median	75%	95%
Tone	0.500	0.069	-0.711	-0.320	0.069	0.376	0.742
	(2.07)	(0.53)	(-3.62)	(-1.33)	(0.32)	(1.53)	(4.92)
Sentiment	2.222	1.095	-1.344	0.071	1.122	1.760	3.308
	(1.93)	(1.16)	(-1.00)	(0.07)	(0.93)	(1.65)	(3.74)

The timing of Google's exit is consistent with a causal interpretation

#### 6.5 Other selection issues

Concern: firms select to engage in profitable opportunities propelled by economic development in foreign countries.

**Solution:** we control for a country's GDP growth in the year when a foreign event occurs and the year before, as well as their interactions with the exit dummy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Foreign Event × Google Exit	0.473**	0.419*	0.568**	0.466*	0.486***	0.354***
	(2.02)	(1.85)	(2.24)	(1.82)	(3.95)	(2.60)
Local GDP Growth	0.455*	-0.136	0.016	-0.952**		
	(1.81)	(-0.39)	(0.06)	(-2.43)		
Local GDP Growth (t-1)		1.159**		1.675**		
		(2.28)		(2.08)		
Local~GDP~Growth  imes Google~Exit			0.765**	1.329***		
			(2.29)	(3.58)		
Local GDP Growth $(t-1) \times Google$	Exit			-0.790		
				(-0.70)		
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm x Country FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Year x Country FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
# of obs.	11,865	11,865	11,865	11,865	17,280	17,280
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.312	0.314	0.312	0.314	0.750	0.587

## 6.6 Annual reports: MD&A

- The timing of annual reports is relatively exogenous and the content is not driven by any particular corporate events.
- Focus on the management's discussion and analysis (MD&A)
- Distinguish between firms that have foreign operations and those that focus their business domestically: *MNC* is equal to one if a firm's foreign sales exceeds 5% of its total sales.

Dependent Variable	Tone	Sentiment	Price Nonsynchronicity
$MNC \times Google \ Exit$	4.913**	0.130*	-0.083***
	(2.51)	(1.75)	(-4.53)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	8,567	8,567	8,822
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.626	0.576	0.440

#### 6.6 Who benefit from bullish disclosures?

Our conjecture: managers gain insider trading profits by having overoptimistic disclosures.

Tests: the volume and profit of insider sales

Dependent	variable:	the	fraction	of
shares sold	by insider	s du	ring a thr	ee-
month post-	-announce	emen	t window	of
a press rele	ase			

Insider sales increase substantially for foreign events

<b>Dependent variable</b> : the three-month
cumulative abnormal return earned by
insiders from the above sales

Selling profits increase substantially for foreign events

	Foreign	Domestic
	Event	Event
Tone × Google Exit	0.102***	-0.000
	(6.35)	(-0.01)
Control variables	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	4,334	7,531
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.030	0.030
-		

	Foreign	Domestic
	Event	Event
Tone × Google Exit	0.039***	0.015
	<b>(7.12)</b>	(0.40)
Control variables	Yes	Yes
# of obs.	735	1,246
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.120	0.080
		_

#### Conclusion

**Question:** does the search-based information transmission help investors monitor firms?

#### **Answers:**

- Yes
- Firms issue overoptimistic corporate press releases when a channel to search for a certain type of firmspecific information is severed