



# Discussion of *Deposit Supply and Bank Transparency*

Mary E. Barth  
Stanford University

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


- Nice setting to study effects on voluntary disclosure of reduced reliance on capital markets
  - Prior research shows firms that access capital markets are more likely to provide voluntary disclosure
  - Follows other studies that exploit the unexpected change in shale development technology
  - This paper adds an accounting angle to this event
- Findings
  - Greater exposure to shale development reduced voluntary disclosure
- Interpretation
  - Deposit windfalls relax incentives for banks to disclose information voluntarily to attract funds



# US shale production

## U.S. dry shale gas production



Sources: EIA derived from state administrative data collected by [DrillingInfo Inc.](#) Data are through August 2014 and represent EIA's official shale gas estimates, but are not survey data. State abbreviations indicate primary state(s).



# Chain of logic

2002 shale development  
positive shock to deposits  
for exposed banks

Exposed



Increase in  
deposits



Decrease in  
external capital



Decrease in  
voluntary disclosure



# Exposed banks?





## Key assumptions

- Shale development was unanticipated and increased bank deposits in the shale boom counties
  - Supported by prior research
- O&G companies moved so fast that banks could not respond by opening branches in the affected areas
  - Would be nice to have some evidence
  - Dates seem to vary across counties—How long does it take to open a branch?
- Any capital market cost to the bank of reduced disclosure (e.g., increased illiquidity) is less than the cost of the voluntary disclosures
  - Would be nice to have corroborating evidence here too



# Tests

2002 shale development  
positive shock to deposits  
for exposed banks

Exposed



10-K MD&A  
8-K voluntary items  
Earnings guidance  
Stock liquidity



Increase in  
deposits



Decrease in  
voluntary disclosure



# Remember the chain of logic

Exposed



Increase in deposits



Decrease in external capital



Decrease in voluntary disclosure



# Link deposits and external capital

- Evidence linking increase in deposits and capital market activity would strengthen the paper
  - Study shows disclosure reductions are stronger for banks that relied more heavily on capital markets in the pre-boom period. But....
  - Would exposed banks have accessed the capital market without the deposit increase?
  - Did exposed banks' capital market access decrease during this period? If so, is the extent of the decrease associated with the amount the new deposits?
  - Are these effects larger for banks closer to funding constraints?



## I would like to know more


- Which geographical areas are included in the study and when did exposure begin in each?
  - Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2013) covers 2003-2010
  - Plosser (2014) covers seven states for 2003-2012
  - This study covers 2003-2007—Why? Does it matter?



# Counties in Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2013)

**Figure 1: Location of Shale Activity**

The figure maps the counties of the 7 shale boom states included in this study: AR, LA, ND, OK, PA, TX and WV. White counties are non-boom counties while shaded counties are shale boom counties as of 2010.





# Counties in Plosser (2014)




Figure 1: Counties Impacted by Unconventional Energy

Figure 1 illustrates the location of counties impacted by unconventional energy development. Shaded counties are divided into quartiles based on the maximum annual payments to landowners relative to lagged deposits.



## I would like to know more

- Which geographical areas are included in the study and when did exposure begin in each?
  - Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2013) covers 2003-2010
  - Plosser (2014) covers seven states for 2003-2012
  - This study covers 2003-2007—Why? Does it matter?
- How large were the initial lease payments? Would they lead to economically meaningful increases in deposits at the affected banks?
- Bank exposure measure based on wells drilled from 2003 to 2007
  - Link to initial land lease payments?
  - Justification? Rational expectations?



## I would like to know more

- The geographical location of bank branches is key to research design
  - Is lack of depositor sophistication another assumption?
  - Why don't these new large depositors use brokered deposits and other liquid investments?
  - What types of deposits? Non-interest bearing? CDs?
  - Do results hold if bank exposure measure were based on number of branches in a shale boom county?
  - Did you consider falsification tests, e.g., using a pseudo event date prior to 2002?



## I would like to know more

- How does the importance of local branches— together with the assumption regarding insufficient reaction time— affect potential effects of competition?
  - It seems local bank branches are immune to competition
  - If so, why would competition be associated with bank reactions to deposit increases from shale development?



## Opportunities to build on related research

- Plosser (2014) shows how banks invest the “extra” unsolicited deposits (e.g., lending versus liquid assets), whereas here the story is substituting deposit increases for other sources of capital
  - Do banks’ investments differ for the portion of the deposit increase that is “extra” versus substituted?
- Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2013) shows affected banks increase mortgage lending in non-boom counties, and conclude that branch networks help integrate US lending markets
  - What role do branch networks play here?



## Other points

- Size, loan loss provision, loss, and capital-asset ratio are controls for “time-varying BHC traits”
  - Why these? What are they intended to capture?
  - Control for number of branches in boom counties?
- *Competition* is based on 2003, and is constant over time
  - Why not 2002? Why constant? If it varied could estimate of its main effect and might affect the interaction coefficient
- Tests focus on mean changes 2000-2002 to 2003-2007
  - Why not focus on change in year lease activity began?
  - Perhaps interact bank exposure with post-shock indicator?
- Cluster standard errors by BHC
  - Why not also by time? Cross-sectional correlation is likely



## Other points

- A correlation table for all variables would be helpful
- Particularly, the various disclosure variables
  - It seems they would be highly correlated, but perhaps capture different aspects of disclosure
  - Not necessarily independent tests
  - Might want to consider factor analysis or another way to construct a single voluntary disclosure measure
  - If differences are important, these need further development
- The modifications variable needs more explanation
  - How are zero modifications coded?  $\text{Log}(1 - 1)$  is undefined
  - What is the interpretation of a positive mean?



## Conclusion

- Interesting paper!
- Thank you for the opportunity to discuss it; I enjoyed reading the paper and learned a lot
- I hope my comments are helpful to you in improving the paper and wish you all the best with it!



Thank you!