

Active Monetary or Fiscal Policy and Stock-Bond Correlation

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
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Beta of 5-Year Treasury Bond

Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2016)



Question

- ▶ What determines the sign of the correlation between stock and bond returns?

Our Explanation

What we propose

- ▶ switch of monetary-fiscal activeness (regimes)
 - ▶ different shocks are amplified/mitigated by policies in different regimes
 - ▶ ⇒ different shocks dominate in different regimes
 - ▶ different dominant shocks generate different return correlations
- ▶ coherent explanation for stock-bond correlation from 1950's until now

Our Explanation

- ▶ The permanent technology (PT) shocks, which dominate in the **AMPF** regime, lead to **positive** stock-bond correlation
 - ▶ **AMPF**: active monetary and passive fiscal policy regime
- ▶ The marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks, which dominate in the **PMAF** regime, lead to **negative** stock-bond correlation
 - ▶ **PMAF**: passive monetary and active fiscal policy regime
- ▶ The permanent technology (PT) and monetary policy (MP) shocks dominate marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks in the **PMPF** regime, lead to **slightly positive** stock-bond correlation
 - ▶ **PMPF**: passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime

Outline

1. Policy Regimes
2. Model
3. Results for Regime Switching Model
4. Robustness Checks

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Monetary Policy Regimes

Leeper (1991)

$$i_t - i = \phi_{\pi}(\pi_t - \pi^*) + \phi_y(\Delta y_t - \Delta y)$$

- ▶ Active monetary policies: $\phi_{\pi} > 1$
1980s and 1990s, stabilize price

- ▶ Passive monetary policies: $0 \leq \phi_{\pi} < 1$
2000s, ZLB without UMP


Fiscal Policy Regimes

Leeper (1991)

$$\tau_t - \tau = \varsigma_b(b_{t-1}^\infty - b^\infty) + \varsigma_g(g_{yt} - g_y) + \varsigma_y(y_t - y),$$

- ▶ Passive fiscal policies: $\varsigma_b > 0$
normal times, stabilize government bond
- ▶ Active fiscal policies: $\varsigma_b = 0$
wars or big recessions (Korean War, Vietnam War), stabilize price

Fiscal Regimes



Government budget constraint

$$\underbrace{G_t - T_t}_{\text{real deficit}} = \frac{\tilde{B}_t - \overbrace{R_t^B \tilde{B}_{t-1}}^{\text{existing nominal liability}}}{P_t}$$

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$$\Rightarrow g_t - \tau_t = \frac{\tilde{b}_t}{Y_t} - \frac{R_t^B}{\Pi_t} \frac{\tilde{b}_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t}$$

Government budget constraint

$$\underbrace{G_t - T_t}_{\text{real deficit}} = \frac{\tilde{B}_t - \overbrace{R_t^B \tilde{B}_{t-1}}^{\text{existing nominal liability}}}{P_t}$$

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- ▶ Passive fiscal policy: $\frac{\tilde{b}_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \uparrow \Rightarrow \tau_t \uparrow \Rightarrow$ BC balances again, nothing else changes


Government budget constraint

$$\underbrace{G_t - T_t}_{\text{real deficit}} = \frac{\tilde{B}_t - \overbrace{R_t^B \tilde{B}_{t-1}}^{\text{existing nominal liability}}}{P_t}$$

$$\Rightarrow g_t - \tau_t = \frac{\tilde{b}_t}{Y_t} - \frac{R_t^B}{\Pi_t} \frac{\tilde{b}_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t}$$

- ▶ Passive fiscal policy: $\frac{\tilde{b}_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \uparrow \Rightarrow \tau_t \uparrow \Rightarrow$ BC balances again, nothing else changes
- ▶ Active fiscal policy: $\frac{\tilde{b}_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \uparrow \Rightarrow \tau_t$ does not change $\Rightarrow \Pi_t$ has to \uparrow to offset the increase in liability \Rightarrow BC balances again due to inflation

Beta of 5-Year Treasury Bond



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Main Features of the Model

A medium scale DSGE model with

- ▶ nominal rigidities
- ▶ recursive preferences
- ▶ monetary-fiscal policy regime switch
- ▶ 4 exogenous structural shocks
 - ▶ permanent technology shock (**PT**)
 - ▶ marginal efficiency of investment shock (**MEI**)
 - ▶ monetary policy shock (MP)
 - ▶ fiscal policy shock (FP)

▶ Monetary & fiscal policies

▶ Stock & bond returns

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Variance Decomposition

Table: Variance Decomposition (Business Cycle Frequency, in %)

Variables	Shocks				AMPF/PMAF/PMPPF
	PT	MEI	MP	FP	
R_s^c	60.66 / 29.48 / 40.40	4.92 / 61.13 / 33.76	34.42 / 9.16 / 25.01	0.00 / 0.22 / 0.83	
R_b^s	53.40 / 3.87 / 22.90	0.61 / 60.13 / 26.90	43.44 / 35.68 / 47.09	2.55 / 0.32 / 3.10	

Positive PT Shock

technology $\uparrow \rightarrow$

- ▶ consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$

Positive PT Shock

technology $\uparrow \rightarrow$

- ▶ consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$
- ▶ ▶ AMPF regime

\rightarrow marginal cost of production $\downarrow \rightarrow$ inflation $\downarrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\Downarrow \rightarrow$ real interest rate $\downarrow \rightarrow$ consumption and output \uparrow

\Rightarrow consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$

Positive PT Shock

technology $\uparrow \rightarrow$

- ▶ consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$
- ▶ ▶ AMPF regime

\rightarrow marginal cost of production $\downarrow \rightarrow$ inflation $\downarrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\Downarrow \rightarrow$ real interest rate $\downarrow \rightarrow$ consumption and output \uparrow
 \Rightarrow consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$

- ▶ PMAF regime
- \rightarrow marginal cost of production $\downarrow \rightarrow$ inflation $\downarrow \xrightarrow{\text{PM}, \phi_\pi < 1}$ nominal interest rate $\searrow \rightarrow$ real interest rate $\uparrow \rightarrow$ consumption and output \downarrow
 \Rightarrow consumption and output \uparrow

Positive PT Shock

technology $\uparrow \rightarrow$

▶ consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$

▶ ▶ AMPF regime

\rightarrow marginal cost of production $\downarrow \rightarrow$ inflation $\downarrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\Downarrow \rightarrow$ real interest rate $\downarrow \rightarrow$ consumption and output \uparrow

\Rightarrow consumption and output $\uparrow\uparrow$

▶ PMAF regime


\rightarrow marginal cost of production $\downarrow \rightarrow$ inflation $\downarrow \xrightarrow{\text{PM}, \phi_\pi < 1}$ nominal interest rate $\searrow \rightarrow$ real interest rate $\uparrow \rightarrow$ consumption and output \downarrow

\Rightarrow consumption and output \uparrow

▶ PMPF regime

\rightarrow lies between the AMPF and PMAF regimes

Positive PT Shock



Positive MEI Shock

► AMPF regime

marginal efficiency of investment $\uparrow \rightarrow$ investment (demand) \uparrow output
 $\uparrow \rightarrow$ labor, wage \uparrow inflation $\uparrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\uparrow\uparrow \rightarrow$
long-term bond return \downarrow

Positive MEI Shock

► AMPF regime

marginal efficiency of investment $\uparrow \rightarrow$ investment (demand) \uparrow output $\uparrow \rightarrow$ labor, wage \uparrow inflation $\uparrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\uparrow\uparrow \rightarrow$ long-term bond return \downarrow

► PMAF regime

marginal efficiency of investment $\uparrow \rightarrow$ investment (demand) \uparrow output $\uparrow \xrightarrow{\text{AF}}$ taxes $\uparrow \rightarrow$ inflation, nominal interest rate \downarrow over longer horizon \rightarrow long-term bond return \uparrow

Positive MEI Shock


► AMPF regime

marginal efficiency of investment $\uparrow \rightarrow$ investment (demand) \uparrow output $\uparrow \rightarrow$ labor, wage \uparrow inflation $\uparrow \xrightarrow{\text{AM}, \phi_\pi > 1}$ nominal interest rate $\uparrow\uparrow \rightarrow$ long-term bond return \downarrow

► PMAF regime

marginal efficiency of investment $\uparrow \rightarrow$ investment (demand) \uparrow output $\uparrow \xrightarrow{\text{AF}}$ taxes $\uparrow \rightarrow$ inflation, nominal interest rate \downarrow over longer horizon \rightarrow long-term bond return \uparrow

Positive MEI Shock



Positive MP Shock

- ▶ Under ALL three regimes, policy rate $\uparrow \rightarrow$ depresses the economy \rightarrow
 - { consumption $\downarrow \rightarrow$ stock return \downarrow
 - { long-term interest rate $\uparrow \rightarrow$ long-term bond return \downarrow

▶ More impulse responses

Correlation Matrix

Table: Bond-Stock Return Correlation — All Shocks

Variables	R_s^c	R_b^s	R_b^c	π	ΔC	AMPF/PMAF/PMPP
R_s^c	1.00	0.82 / -0.32 / 0.05	0.64 / 0.51 / 0.69	-0.39 / -0.05 / 0.07	0.55 / 0.51 / 0.51	-0.71 / -0.54 / -0.42
R_b^s		1.00	0.42 / -0.47 / -0.22	-0.36 / -0.15 / -0.18	0.47 / -0.16 / 0.00	-0.71 / -0.19 / -0.40
R_b^c			1.00	0.06 / 0.30 / 0.37	0.34 / 0.24 / 0.30	0.08 / 0.45 / 0.36
π				1.00	-0.69 / -0.29 / -0.17	0.57 / 0.37 / 0.38
ΔC					1.00	-0.40 / -0.30 / -0.28
M						1.00

Correlation Matrix

Table: Bond-Stock Return Correlation without the PT Shock

Variables	R_s^c	R_b^s	R_b^c	π	ΔC	AMPF/PMAF/PMPP
R_s^c	1.00	0.65 / -0.51 / -0.20	0.99 / 1.00 / 0.99	0.05 / 0.19 / 0.28	0.62 / 0.61 / 0.64	-0.89 / -0.90 / -0.91
R_b^s		1.00	0.69 / -0.44 / -0.14	0.19 / -0.10 / -0.07	0.42 / -0.31 / -0.12	-0.64 / 0.37 / 0.07
R_b^c			1.00	0.05 / 0.18 / 0.27	0.62 / 0.61 / 0.64	-0.92 / -0.92 / -0.93
π				1.00	-0.09 / 0.11 / 0.32	0.12 / 0.14 / 0.00
ΔC					1.00	-0.50 / -0.49 / -0.52
M						1.00

Correlation Matrix

Table: Bond-Stock Return Correlation without the MEI Shock

Variables	R_s^c	R_b^s	R_b^c	π	ΔC	AMPF/PMAF/PMPF
R_s^c	1.00	0.97 / 0.70 / 0.77	0.52 / -0.33 / 0.21	-0.42 / -0.49 / -0.20	0.56 / 0.44 / 0.42	-0.79 / -0.86 / -0.67
R_b^s		1.00	0.55 / 0.32 / 0.19	-0.39 / -0.15 / -0.23	0.55 / 0.29 / 0.31	-0.73 / -0.32 / -0.53
R_b^c			1.00	0.16 / 0.48 / 0.49	0.29 / -0.15 / -0.02	0.12 / 0.76 / 0.58
π				1.00	-0.73 / -0.73 / -0.59	0.61 / 0.59 / 0.55
ΔC					1.00	-0.44 / -0.38 / -0.37
M						1.00

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Robustness

Our results hold for

- ▶ Effective lower bound regime:

$$\phi_\pi, \phi_y \rightarrow 0$$

- ▶ Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference

$$M_{t,t+1} = \beta_t \frac{U'(C_{t+1})}{U'(C_t)}$$

- ▶ No habit formation

$$C_{h,t} = C_t - b\bar{C}_{t-1}, \quad b = 0$$

▶ Appendix

Conclusion

- ▶ Monetary-fiscal policy regime matters:
 - ▶ PT shock dominates in determining the return dynamics under AMPF, and leads to positive β for nominal long-term Treasury bonds
 - ▶ MEI shock dominates in determining the return dynamics under PMAF, and leads to negative β for nominal long-term Treasury bonds
 - ▶ PT and MP shocks dominate the MEI shock in determining the return dynamics under PMPF, and leads to slightly positive β for nominal long-term Treasury bonds

Policies

- ▶ Monetary policy:

$$R_t = R_{t-1}^{\phi_{R,s}} \left[R \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t^*} \right)^{\phi_{\pi,s}} \left(\frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1} \exp(\mu^{z^+})} \right)^{\phi_{y,s}} \right]^{1-\phi_{R,s}} \epsilon_{R,t}^{\sigma_{R,t}}$$

- ▶ Fiscal policy:

$$\tilde{\tau}_t = \phi_{\tau,s} \tilde{\tau}_{t-1} + (1 - \phi_{\tau,s}) \left[\varsigma_{b,s} \tilde{b}_{t-1}^\infty + \varsigma_{g,s} \tilde{g}_{yt} + \varsigma_{y,s} \hat{y}_t \right] + \sigma_\tau e_{\tau,t}$$

where $\tilde{\tau}_t \equiv T_t/Y_t - T/Y$

- ▶ constant government-spending-to-GDP ratio
- ▶ Government budget constraint:

$$\frac{Q_t^\infty B_t^\infty}{P_t} = R_t^B \frac{Q_{t-1}^\infty B_{t-1}^\infty}{P_t} + G_t - T_t$$

Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix

- ▶ **AMPF** regime: $\phi_\pi > 1$ and $\varsigma_b > \beta^{-1} - 1$
- ▶ **PMAF** regime: $\phi_\pi < 1$ and $\varsigma_b < \beta^{-1} - 1$
- ▶ **PMPF** regime: $\phi_\pi < 1$ and $\varsigma_b > \beta^{-1} - 1$

▶ back

Stock Returns

- ▶ Stock price: $S_t^c = P_t C_t^\lambda + \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t,t+1}^\$ S_{t+1}^c \right]$
- ▶ Excess stock return: $R_{s,t}^c = \frac{S_t^c}{S_{t-1}^c - P_{t-1} C_{t-1}^\lambda} - R_{t-1}$


Long-term Government Bond

$$\begin{aligned}Q_t^\infty &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+s}^\$ \rho^{s-1} \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t,t+1}^\$ (1 + \rho Q_{t+1}^\infty) \right] \\R_t^B &= \frac{1 + \rho Q_t^\infty}{Q_{t-1}^\infty}\end{aligned}$$


- ▶ B_t^∞ : amount issued at t , infinity coupon payments, starting from $t+1$ with \$1 and decaying every period at rate ρ
- ▶ yield: $\frac{1}{Q_t^\infty} - (1 - \rho)$
- ▶ effective duration (5 years): $\frac{1}{1 - \rho / (1 + y_d)}$

▶ back

Positive MP Shock




Positive FP Shock




▶ back

Positive PT Shock — CRRA



Positive MEI Shock — CRRA




Correlation Matrix


Table: Bond-Stock Return Correlation — CRRA

Variables	R_s^c	R_b^s	R_b^c	π	ΔC	M
R_s^c	1.00	0.82 / -0.32 / 0.07	0.63 / 0.50 / 0.67	-0.40 / -0.06 / 0.06	0.55 / 0.51 / 0.51	-0.71 / -0.54 / -0.44
R_b^s		1.00	0.42 / -0.47 / -0.21	-0.36 / -0.15 / -0.17	0.47 / -0.15 / 0.02	-0.71 / -0.19 / -0.41
R_b^c			1.00	0.06 / 0.30 / 0.37	0.35 / 0.24 / 0.30	0.09 / 0.46 / 0.36
π				1.00	-0.69 / -0.30 / -0.18	0.57 / 0.37 / 0.38
ΔC					1.00	-0.39 / -0.29 / -0.29
M						1.00

Positive PT Shock — No Habit



Positive MEI Shock — No Habit



Correlation Matrix

Table: Bond-Stock Return Correlation — No Habit

Variables	R_s^c	R_b^s	R_b^c	π	ΔC	M
R_s^c	1.00	0.82 / -0.32 / 0.05	0.63 / 0.50 / 0.68	-0.40 / -0.06 / 0.07	0.55 / 0.51 / 0.52	-0.71 / -0.54 / -0.43
R_b^s		1.00	0.42 / -0.47 / -0.22	-0.37 / -0.15 / -0.18	0.47 / -0.15 / 0.01	-0.71 / -0.19 / -0.41
R_b^c			1.00	0.06 / 0.30 / 0.37	0.35 / 0.24 / 0.30	0.09 / 0.45 / 0.36
π				1.00	-0.69 / -0.29 / -0.17	0.57 / 0.37 / 0.39
ΔC					1.00	-0.39 / -0.29 / -0.29
M						1.00

▶ back