

Can Partial Commitment Increase Pension Contribution?

Two Field Experiments in Sri Lanka

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ABFER, May 28, 2019

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How to Increase Pension Contribution?

- ▶ Especially in Developing Countries
 - ▶ Aging Society
 - ▶ Many People NOT Covered by Other Plans
- ▶ Test Two Components:
 1. Incentives
 - ▶ Match 100% First Month Contribution
 - ▶ Free Installment for First Month
 2. Commitment
 - ▶ High/ Low (20%/ 10%) Withdrawal Penalty

Experiment I: 3x2 Design

- ▶ Micro Pensions (Surakuma) in Sri Lanka
 - ▶ Hold Society Meetings (Partner with NGO)
 - ▶ Randomize High/ Low Penalty at Village Level
 - ▶ 20% vs. 10%: Half of the Villages Each
 - ▶ Hand Out Vouchers and Invite Sign-ups
 - ▶ Randomize Incentives at Subject Level
1. **Match** 100% First Month Contribution
 2. **Free Installment** for First Month
 3. Control

Experiment I: Results

- ▶ **Free Installment** Quadruples Sign-up Rate
- ▶ **Matching** Triples Sign-up Rate
 - ▶ Little Increase in Contribution/ Commitment
 - ▶ Account Allocation Conditional on Sign-up
- ▶ Commitment: High/ Low Penalty No Effect
- ▶ Regressions Confirm this
 - ▶ If you want stars, you get stars!
- ▶ Why?
 - ▶ Literature Found High Penalty Effective

Experiment I: Further Investigation

- ▶ Because of **Liquidity Constraints?** **No!**
 - ▶ Surveyed Subject Income. Also Surveyed...
- ▶ **Present Bias?**
- ▶ Add Survey Responses to Regression:
 - ▶ Free Installment Attracts Present Bias People
 - ▶ Sign-up (& Contribute?) Less if Present Bias
 - ▶ Stars Disappear in New Version (w/ More Data)
 - ▶ Treatment Effect Stronger if Present-Bias
- ▶ **Yes**, Since They Like Delayed Payments

Experiment II: Somewhat Confusing Design

- ▶ **Free Installment** For Everybody (Not Clear!!)
- ▶ **Commitment** Vary Across Treatment:
- ▶ **Very High**: 100% in High Penalty Account
- ▶ **High**: 50% High Penalty, 50% Flexible
- ▶ **Low**: 50% Low Penalty, 50% Flexible
- ▶ **Choice**: Choose between **Very High** & **High**
- ▶ Why This Design?
 - ▶ Unknown Administrative Constraints?
 - ▶ What Effect Size (and How Big should N be)?

Experiment II: Results

- ▶ **Very High** and **Low** Have Lowest Sign-up
- ▶ **High** and **Choice** Increase Sign-up Rates
 - ▶ In Old Version: **Choice** Had Highest Sign-up
- ▶ Regression: If you want stars, you get stars!
- ▶ Why? Sophistication Reduces Sign-up
 - ▶ Contribution? Conditional on Sign-up or not?
- ▶ **High/ Choice** Treatment Effects Higher if Sophisticated
 - ▶ But Baseline is **Very High**?!

Conclusion

- ▶ **Two** Field Experiments in Sri Lanka to induce saving in micro pensions
- ▶ Results:
 - ▶ **Free Installment Rules!**
 - ▶ Commitment has Mixed Effects:
 - ▶ **Very High** and Low Have Lowest Sign-up
 - ▶ **High** and **Choice** Increase
- ▶ What to Make of These Results?