The Missing Home Buyers: Regional Heterogeneity and Credit Contractions

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Unprecedented decrease in young home ownership since the Great Recession

- Persistent drop below pre-boom level Age decomposition Long run
- Major concern for policymakers and mortgage sector in North America and Europe



Source: AHS

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- Time effect (post-recession) vs. cohort (Millennials)
- Implications for housing markets (persistence) and stimulus policies

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This Paper

- 1. New facts on young home buyers in panel of US metro areas
 - Regional heterogeneity: delaying concentrated in high-house price regions
 - Mortgage standards change uniformly nationwide
 - Channel: regionally-binding credit constraints
- 2. Structural model of regional housing and rental markets
 - ► Key features: GE + mobility + cohort differences
 - New: link macro-finance model to regional panel data
 - Indirect inference and counterfactual experiments on "missing buyers"

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Results

- Short run: dynamics explained by heterogeneous impacts of aggregate credit contraction
 Uniform LTV and PTI tightening explains cross-section of young home ownership busts
- **Long run:** differences between cohorts persistently decrease Millennial home ownership
 - ▶ Heterog effects: depress high-price owner-occupied housing, boost low-price and rental
- **Policy:** differences between regions dampen effectiveness of subsidies to first-time buyers
 - Place-based subsidies improve it

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Literature

- Exit from home ownership via foreclosures: Mian-Rao-Sufi-Trebbi 2009-19, Piskorski-Seru 2018, Guren-McQuade 2020, Kaplan-Mitman-Violante 2020
 - Here: Less entry into home ownership via delaying
- Regional heterogeneity and agg shocks: Lamont-Stein 1999, Lustig-Van Nieuwerburgh 2010, Landvoigt-Piazzesi-Schneider 2015, Hurst-Keys-Seru-Vavra 2016, Jones-Midrigan-Philippon 2018, Beraja-Hurst-Vavra 2019
 - Here: Endogenous house price distribution and mobility
- Young home buyers: Mankiw-Weil 1989, Ortalo-Magné-Rady 2006, Kaplan 2012, Glover-Heathcote-Krueger-Ríos-Rull 2017, Bleemer-Brown-Lee-Strair-van der Klaauw 2017, Goodman-Mayer 2018, Wong 2019, Berger-Turner-Zwick 2019, Isen-Goodman-Yannelis 2019, Amromin-Eberly-Mondragon 2019
 - Here: Regional heterogeneity
- Real estate: Saiz 2010, Van Nieuwerburgh-Weill 2010, Gyourko-Mayer-Sinai 2013, Davidoff 2013, Guerrieri-Hartley-Hurst 2013, Nathanson-Zwick 2018, Favilukis-Mabille-Van Nieuwerburgh 2019
- Heterogeneous agents models with housing: Berger-Vavra 2005, Favilukis-Ludvigson-Van Nieuwerburgh 2017, Rognlie-Shleifer-Simsek 2018, Greenwald 2018, Kaplan-Mitman-Violante 2020



Facts on Young Buyers

2 An Equilibrium Model of Regional Housing Markets

Short Run and Long Run

Housing Stimulus Policies (First-Time Homebuyer Credit)



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3 Short Run and Long Run

Housing Stimulus Policies (First-Time Homebuyer Credit)

Data: Panel of U.S. Metro Areas in 2005-2017

Challenge: Young home buyers' mortgage standards

- Borrower- vs. loan-level data
- Here: first-time home buyers
- **Sources**, merged at MSA level:
 - Mortgage originations: Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax (New York Fed)
 - Mortgage standards: Single Family Loan-Level Datasets (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac)
 - House prices and rents: ZHVI, ZRI (Zillow)
 - Demographics and housing: American Community Survey, American Housing Survey
- Low house-price (e.g. Detroit) vs. high-house price (e.g. SF)

Facts #1: Young Home Buyers

Young home ownership rates diverge across regions after recession



Facts #1: Young Home Buyers

Originations decrease more in high-price regions after recession



Facts #1: Young Home Buyers Map

Ages of first-time buyers diverge across regions after recession



Fact #2: First-Time Mortgage Standards

Loan characteristics covary strongly across regions



Pierre Mabille (INSEAD)

Intuition: Regionally-Binding Credit Constraints

- Mortgage rate r^b , maturity n, max LTV and PTI θ_{LTV} , θ_{PTI} , income Y
- Mortgage payment formula \Rightarrow PTI max loan size $= \frac{1 (1 + r^b)^{-n}}{r^b} \theta_{PTI} Y$
- LTV max loan size = $\theta_{LTV} \times \text{price}$
- Max affordable price $\overline{P} = \min \left[\frac{1 (1 + r^b)^{-n}}{r^b} \theta_{PTI} Y + \text{down, } \frac{\text{down}}{1 \theta_{LTV}} \right]$

Intuition: Regionally-Binding Credit Constraints

• Max affordable price
$$\overline{P} = \min \left[\frac{1 - (1 + r^b)^{-n}}{r^b} \theta_{PTI} Y + \text{down, } \frac{\text{down}}{1 - \theta_{LTV}} \right]$$



Simple calculations ignore heterogeneity, option to rent, to migrate, local vs. agg shocks

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Model Ingredients Bellman eqn

- ▶ OLG heterog households w / life-cycle and incomplete markets → Young constrained buyers
- ▶ Regional heterogeneity → Cross-section of housing markets
 - Construction costs
 - Price-elasticity of housing supply
 - Amenities
- Local and aggregate shocks
 - Income
 - Mortgage standards on long-term debt (LTV, PTI, fees)
- Key features
 - Dynamics of local house prices and rents endogenous
 - Mobility
 - Cohort differences: initial income and wealth
- Full transition dynamics

Calibration: External Parameters

Parameter	Explanation	Value	Source/Target		
External: aggregate					
γ	Risk aversion	2.000	Standard		
ϵ	CES parameter housing/consumption	0.200	Elasticity of substitution=1.25		
$ ho_e$	Autocorrelation income	0.914	Floden-Linde 2001		
$\sigma_{arepsilon}$	Std. dev. income	0.097	Floden-Linde 2001		
r^b	Mortgage rate	0.050	Pre-boom 30-year FRM		
$ ilde{ heta}$	Mortgage duration	0.969	Gorea-Midrigan 2018		
f_o	Proportional transaction cost selling	0.060	Kaplan et al 2020		
F_r	Fixed mortgage origination fee	0.006	Kaplan et al 2020		
f_r	Proportional mortgage origination fee	0.008	Kaplan et al 2020		
δ	Housing depreciation/maintenance	0.015	Kaplan et al 2020		
_	Student debt	\$40,000 at 21-32 y.o.	CCP		
μ_{e_0}	Earnings 15 yrs after graduating in recession	-12.5%	Kahn 2010		
External: regional					
ρ _L , ρ _H	Housing supply elasticity	2.700,1.800	Saiz 2010		

Calibration: Internal Parameters

Parameter	Explanation	Value	Source/Target		
	Internal: aggregate				
β	Discount factor	0.952	Wealth/income=4.40		
α	Preference for housing services	0.400	Rent/income=0.23		
L	Mortgage spread	0.006	Mortgage debt/income=1		
θ_{LTV}	Max. LTV ratio	0.900	Upper LTV distribution		
θ_{PTI}	Max. PTI ratio	0.580	Upper PTI distribution		
т	Utility cost of moving	2.750	Avg moving rate L-H=1.7%		
Internal: regional					
$\overline{I_L}, \overline{I_H}$	Inv. cost residential investment	0.048,0.014	$P_L = \$100K, P_H = \$240K$		
Ξ_L^r, Ξ_H^r	Amenity benefits	0,0.508	$R_L = \$1, 111, R_H = \$1, 206$		
Ξ_L^{o}, Ξ_H^{o}	Homeownership benefits	0.822,0.904	$ho_L^{hh}=69\%$, $ho_H^{hh}=67\%$		

Variable	Data L	Model L	Data H	Model H	
Price per unit	100,000	100,000	240,000	240,000	
Rent per unit	1,111	1,010	1,206	1,415	
Homeownership rate	0.69	0.69	0.67	0.67	
Income	29,300	29,309	38,261	38,253	
Price/income	3.41	3.41	6.27	6.27	
Price/rent	7.50	8.25	16.58	14.13	
Population share	0.42	0.39	0.58	0.61	

Limited spatial sorting

- Why? Option to rent + mobility cost between MSAs
- ▶ Why important? Regionally-binding constraints amplify credit shocks

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Short Run and Long Run

Housing Stimulus Policies (First-Time Homebuyer Credit)

Short Run (Transition Dynamics): Response to Credit Contraction

- Main experiment: feed in uniform transitory shocks to match household leverage decrease
 - $\theta_{LTV,t}$ decreases from 90% to 72%, $\theta_{PTI,t}$ from 58% to 29%
- ▶ Aggregate tightening of mortgage standards \rightarrow home ownership \downarrow in level and cross-section

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Credit Constraints Decomposition Credit standards House prices

- LTV more binding for youngest buyers
- PTI more binding for middle-aged buyers, esp. in high-price MSAs



Long Run (Steady State): Impact of Cohort Differences

Counterfactual: Millennials have no student debt and no worse initial labor market

- Baseline: persistently lower home ownership b/c slower wealth accumulation: -6 pp
 - Larger effect of graduating in recession (prices -6%) than of student debt (-2%)
- Heterogeneous impact on housing markets
 - ▶ **Regions:** depress high-price owner-occupied, boost low-price → Relocation Population
 - **Sectors:** boost rentals \rightarrow Delaying Rents

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Regional Heterogeneity Dampens Effectiveness of FTHC

\$8k subsidy uniform across regions (2008-10) Background

- "One size fits all" subsidy boosts housing demand relatively less in high-price MSAs
- Small welfare gains because preference for high-price MSAs



Improving the Effectiveness of FTHC

- Place-based subsidy: proportional to local house prices, budget-neutral
- Larger, persistent welfare gains
- Design of housing stabilization should account for price differences and regional preferences



Conclusion

- "Regional macro-finance"
 - MSA panel on first-time buyers
 - Equilibrium model of regional housing and rental markets
- ▶ Regionally-binding credit constraints affect first-time buyers → short run, long run, policy
- More results in the paper!

Age Decomposition of Home Ownership



Source: AHS



Long Run: Home Ownership (Jack)

Source: AHS

- Mean-reversion in aggregate home ownership after the housing boom of the 1990-2000s
- But young home ownership persistently below pre-boom level

Long Run: Age Decomposition of Home Ownership



Source: AHS

Demographic Determinants of Home Ownership

Home ownership rate	2005-15 change (pp)			
All	-6.1			
Age				
25-34	-14.7			
Income				
Q3	-7.4			
Race				
Black	-6.3			
Education				
Less than high school	-8.5			
Household composition				
Female single householder, with kids	-9.7			

Sources: AHS, Goodman-Mayer (2018)

Regional Distribution of House Price Levels



(blue=bottom 50% of median house price distribution, red=top 50%) Source: Zillow

Millennial Attitude Towards Home Ownership

- Scarring effect à la Malmendier-Nagel 2011?
- Indirect measures
 - ACS: h.o. of households likely to buy and be unconstrained (prime white hhs 25-34 y.o., married with children, annual income > \$100k): -2.8 pp vs. -5.4 pp all hhs in 1990-2015

Surveys

- Survey of Consumer Expectations' Housing Survey (New York Fed)
 - "Would you like to own instead of rent your primary residence?": 71.3% yes (19.4% no)
 - ▶ "Vs. other financial investments, buying in your zip code today is": 64.9% good (9.1% bad)
- Housing Confidence Survey (Pulsenomics)
 - "Is housing a good long-term investment?"
- National Housing Survey (Fannie Mae, e.g. Adelino-Schoar-Severino 2018)
- *Model*: interpret as residual ≈ 0

Young vs. Old Home Ownership Across Regions



Source: ACS, Zillow

Loan Application, Rejection, Foreclosure Rates Across Regions



Source: HMDA, RealtyTrac, Zillow

Mortgage Underwriting Standards (All Loans)



Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA, CoreLogic, Urban Institute

Securitization of First-Time Mortgages



Source: FRBNY CCP/Equifax

Household Problem: Not Buying in High-Price MSA

Renter from H:

$$V_t^{rH} = \max\left[V_t^{rH,rH}, V_t^{rH,rL}, V_t^{rH,oH}, V_t^{rH,oL}\right]$$

Renter from H buying a house in L:

$$\begin{split} V_t^{rH,oL}\left(a,b_t,y_t\right) &= \max_{c_t,h_t,b_{t+1}} \frac{u(c_t,h_t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \Xi_H - m + \beta \left[p^a \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1}^{oL}\left(a+1,b_{t+1},y_{t+1}\right) + (1-p^a) U_{t+1} \right] \\ U_{t+1} &= U \left(b_{t+1} + P_{L,t+1} \overline{h} \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad c_t + \frac{R_{H,t}}{h_t} + \frac{P_{L,t}}{h} \overline{h}(1+f_r) + F_r + b_{t+1} = y_t - T\left(y_t\right) + (1+r) b_t \\ b_{t+1} &\geq -\theta_{LTV,t} P_{L,t} \overline{h} \\ b_{t+1} &\geq -\frac{\theta_{PTI,t} y_t}{(1+r^b - \overline{\theta})} \end{split}$$

Solving for Dynamics of Regional House Price Distribution

- Challenge: solve for $\{P_{L,t}, P_{H,t}, R_{L,t}, R_{H,t}\}$ in response to local and aggregate shocks
- Numerical solution for class of regional models
 - Calibrate steady state regional house price distribution
 - Invert market-clearing conditions: \overline{h} , homogeneity of I(p)
 - Compute nonlinear transition dynamics in response to unanticipated shocks
 - Smooth discrete choice problem: idiosyncratic taste shocks ~ type I Extreme Value
- New: combine macro-finance model and regional panel data

Model Fit: Aggregate Moments (Jack)

Targeted moments	Variable	Ι	Data	Мо	del	
	Wealth/income		4.40	4.	15	
	Avg. rent/ income		0.23	0.	22	
	Leverage	(0.37	0.	32	
	P90 LTV	(0.92	0.	83	
	P90 PTI	(0.58	0.	56	
	Migration Rate	0	.016	0.0	014	
Untargeted LTV and PTI		LTV				PTI
		Data	Moo	del	Data	a Model
	P10	0.19	0.2	6	_	0.08
	P25	0.40	0.4	4	_	0.13
	P50	0.64	0.6	2	0.36	0.28
	P75	0.79	0.7	9	0.48	0.37
	P90 (targeted)	0.92	0.8	3	0.58	0.56

Model: Regional Life-Cycle Profiles



Short Run (Transition Dynamics): Response to Credit Contraction

▲ back

- ▶ House prices ↓ in level and cross-section
 - Even without different local shocks or housing supply elasticities



Short Run: Cross-Sectional Housing Market Volatility

- Usually attributed to housing supply restrictions ρ_j, *I*_j
 e.g. Saiz instrument in Mian-Sufi
- Here: any driver of preexisting differences in house price levels $P_H > P_L$
 - Young buyers' credit constraints more binding in H
 - ► $\overline{I_H} = \overline{I_L}$ and $\rho_H = \rho_L$ decreases differences in house price decline from 8 pp to 3.5 pp
 - $\blacktriangleright \Xi_H = \Xi_L$ decreases difference in house price declines from 8 pp to 3 pp
- ▶ Time-varying: more heterogeneous house price distribution → more heterogeneous busts
 - Amplification in 2005 vs. 1997
 - Explains "sand states" puzzle during Great Recession

Time-Varying Impact of Credit Constraints

- Heterogeneous house price levels \Rightarrow heterogeneous busts
- **Counterfactual:** response to same shocks with more equal 1997 house price distribution
 - ▶ 2005 price distribution amplifies regional differences and aggregate price decline



Impacts of Shocks Impacts



Impacts of Regional Differences Impacts



Extended Model: Price Responses



Extended Model: Leverage Response



Extended Model: Consumption Response



Regional Population Changes • back







Stimulus Policy: First-Time Home Buyer Credit

- **Background** (2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act)
 - Tax credit of \$8,000 for first-time buyers with annual income below \$112,000
 - Unanticipated subsidy during recession, financed by distortionary taxes
- ▶ Validation: cushions bust in h.o. 10%, agg price 1% ≈ estimates (Berger-Turner-Zwick 2019)