# Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China

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# Summary

- Demand for government participation in the VCPE market in China
  - For both GP and LP
- Novelty:
  - Creative research design: field experiment in a high-stake setting
  - Combination of administrative data and experimental data
  - Model with discussion on the equilibrium effects



# **Main Findings**

- Field experiment with the leading VCPE organization in China (Zero2IPO)
  - Surveyed 688 GPs and 312 LPs to solicit preference
  - Randomized synthetic profiles that mimic real investors/managers on its platform
- GPs show little interest for LPs with government ties, especially for nongovernment-affiliated GPs
  - Additional survey evidence suggest interference in decision making as the main cost of government capital
- LPs value GPs with government ties
- Build a model that quantifies the distributional consequence of government participation in the VCPE market



#### **Experiment Design: Selection**

- Field experiment with "real" mangers/investors: high stake setting
- Incentive to participate in the 45-minute survey
  - Well explained in the paper
- Aware of experiment nature; truthful reporting
- Experiments sent to 1600 GPs and 790 LPs
  - Total sample of >6300 active GPs and > 7900 LPs
- Response rate (>43%)
  - High!
  - Likely less well-funded and with less access to capital?
  - Would be nice to show comparison stats



### **GP: Demand for LP Characteristics**

- Physical capital
- Intangible capital
  - Industry expertise
  - Managerial (or supervisory skill)
  - Access to capital market
  - Other resources: e.g., ability to secure customers/suppliers, get licensing/permit or other regulatory approval
    Harder to quantify in the LP profile
- Government vs. Private LP: different comparative advantage
  - GP chooses LP that can best meet their needs (with complementary resources) mm



#### Information Issue in the Experiment: GP side

- How much soft information is reserved under the experiment?
  - Especially regarding the intangible capital of LP
- Particularly relevant for government-affiliated LP
  - Can GPs have sufficient ability to decipher the value of connections?
  - Likely specific to the identity of the government-affiliated LP
- With incomplete information, benefit of government connection can be underestimated
  - Cons are more salient than pros; easier to anticipate and evaluate



#### **Back to the Selection Issue**

- GPs that value more on the quantifiable components of LP profiles respond
  - More capital-constrained GPs
  - GPs with less demand for the implicit benefits of government connections
- Preference against government-affiliated LPs: only for non-Gov GPs
  - Gov-affiliated GPs focus less on the potential benefit of Gov-affiliated LPs
  - Non-Gov GPs more likely to value the potential benefit and choose not to respond if difficult to assess
- Check response rate by GP characteristics?



#### Information Issue in the Experiment: LP Side

- Determinants of LP preference
- Cash flow generating potential of GPs
- Government-affiliated GPs
  - Indication of stronger ability to generate cashflow
  - Assumption: GP must have the right resources through its government connection
  - Absence of detailed information on government ties is less of a problem



#### **Other Comments**

- Correlation structure of the independent variables
- Is Government ties highly correlated with
  - Large investor
  - Headquarter in Beijing
  - Possible to proxy for some of the benefits of government ties?
- How likely is the dislike for LP with government ties affected by GP's expectation of their funding probability?
  - Part of the survey incentive is for Zero2IPO to introduce matching LPs to GPs

