

# Leaning Against the Wind: An Empirical Cost-Benefit Analysis

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### **Should countries lean against the wind? How?**

When countries face domestic or external financial shocks, how do macroprudential-, monetary-, FX-, and CFM policies compare?

#### **Domestic developments - Macropru vs. Monetary policy:**

- Macroprudential better targeted, allows monetary policy to focus on inflation, output.
- Monetary policy "gets in all the cracks" (Stein 2013)
- Analysis so far does not favor LATW by monetary policy to reduce crisis probability (IMF 2015, Svensson 2016).
- Evidence that macropru is effective, but no systematic comparison to macropru so far

### **Should countries lean against the wind? How?**

#### **External shocks**

- Exchange rate not always sufficient shock absorber (Rey 2013, Obstfeld 2015, Arregui and others 2018)
- In practice, countries use a range of policy tools to address external shocks.
- So far, no systematic empirical comparison of policies
- Existing studies have limitations
  - ► Focus on the tail risk of crises, or specific channels

## New approach

### • Two steps

- Quantile regressions to estimate policy effects on the entire distributions of future growth and inflation
  - Built on the Growth-at-Risk approach (e.g., Adrian et al. 2018, 2019)
- Loss functions to evaluate the net benefit of each policy

### Key advantages

- Go beyond **tail risks** or crises
- Capture **all channels** at work in the data

### Main findings

Leaning against loose financial conditions is...


- Beneficial with macroprudential policy
- Not beneficial with monetary policy
- Only small net benefits with **CFMs** and **FXIs**

# **Empirical Approach**

- Going beyond Growth-at-Risk –

## Starting point: the Growth-at-Risk approach


- Growth-at-risk (GaR) framework forecasts the conditional distribution of GDP growth (e.g., Adrian et al. 2018, 2019)
- **GaR** is growth at a lower percentile



Loose financial conditions today increase downside risks to GDP tomorrow (e.g., Adrian et al. 2018)


**Step 1 in this paper:** Can any policy can reduce the **downside** risks?

### Going beyond Growth-at-Risk



# Step 1. Quantile regressions

## Step 1: Quantile regressions



- **Regress future GDP growth** on current economic and domestic financial conditions (Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone, 2019)
- Interested in  $\beta_3^h(q)$  on the interaction term of f with policy variable P
  - for  $q = 5^{\text{th}}$ , ...  $95^{\text{th}}$  quantiles and h = 1, ..., H quarters
  - Sample of 37 countries (AE and EME), 1990Q1-2016Q4
  - Domestic financial condition index (IMF, 2018)
- Do the same estimation for future inflation

### Use policy shocks to address endogeneity

- Policy actions are endogenous
- Extract **unexpected variation** in policy variables
  - Estimate **policy response functions**
  - Compute policy shocks as residuals
  - Ordered probit for Macroprudential policy and CFMs
  - OLS for Monetary policy and FX interventions

## Macroprudential tightening reduces downside risks

0.8

- Responses of the Growth-at-Risk to a FCI loosening
  - No policy:  $\beta_1^h(q)$
  - With policy:  $\beta_1^h(q) + \beta_3^h(q)\sigma^P$
- Tightening MaPP mitigate downside risks in the medium term
- Short-run effects are not significant

0.6 —No policy -With policy 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 2 1 3 5 12 13 14 6 9 10 11 Horizon (quarters)

Notes: 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of detrended RGDP growth.


 $\sigma^P$ : Standard deviation of P

# However, monetary policy tightening rather increases downside risks

- Responses of the Growth-at-Risk to a FCI loosening
  - No policy:  $\beta_1^h(q)$
  - With policy:  $\beta_1^h(q) + \beta_3^h(q)\sigma^P$

 "Leaning against the wind" appears counter-productive in addressing tail risks

• In line with Svensson (2017)




Notes: 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of detrended RGDP growth.

 $\sigma^P$ : Standard deviation of P

# Step 2. Analysis using loss functions

Can any policy have net-benefits, reflecting the effects on the *entire* distribution?

# How can we compare the effects on the *entire* distribution over horizons?



### Use a loss functions in evaluating net-benefits

$$L(\boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{P}) = \sum_{h=0}^{H} \boldsymbol{\beta}^{h} \, \widehat{E_{t}}[l_{t+h} | \boldsymbol{\Theta}, \boldsymbol{P}]$$

where

$$l_{t+h} = \omega_y (y_{t+h} - \overline{y_t})^2 + \omega_\pi \pi_{t+h}^2$$

- Quadratic loss function (baseline) for macro stabilization
- $\omega_y$  and  $\omega_\pi$  weights on relative importance of **output** and **price** stability

**Compare losses** for each policy *P*:  $L(\Theta, P = 0)$  vs.  $L(\Theta, P = \sigma^{P})$ 

#### **Calculate Benefits/Losses associated with each Policy**

To estimate moments, fit skewed-Normal distribution using 19 quantiles and minimize distance between EQF and theoretical quantile function (TQF)

$$\theta^* = \underset{\theta \in \Theta}{\operatorname{arg\,min}} \sum_{q=1}^{19} \left( EQF_i(\overline{x}) - SkewTQF(\theta) \right)^2$$

### Macroprudential policy tightening reduces losses, but monetary policy tightening increases losses

	Domestic Shock				
	α −1 α −0	o −1 o −1	ω <sub>y</sub> =0.542,		
	$\omega_{\gamma}=1, \omega_{p}=0 \qquad \omega_{\gamma}=1, \omega_{p}=1$		$ω_p$ =1		
MPM All	-0.089 ***	-0.085 ***	-0.083 ***		
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.100 ***	-0.068 ***	-0.065 ***		
MPM FI-Based	-0.053 **	-0.036 **	-0.035 **		
MP	0.121 ***	0.115 ***	0.111 ***		
FXI	-	-	-		
CFM	-	-	-		

Notes: Changes in losses by tightening *P*, in percent of losses without policy ( $L_o(\Theta, P = 0)$ ). Confidence bands in brackets. Inference based on cluster bootstrap. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means significance at 10, 5, 1 percent levels.

### Consider a loosening in global financial conditions

$$Q_{Yi,t+h}(q|Z_{it}) = \alpha_{0i}^{h}(q) + \beta_{1}^{h}(q)f_{it}$$
  
Domestic FCI  
$$+\beta_{2}^{h}(q)g_{t} + \beta_{3}^{h}(q)P_{it} + \beta_{4}^{h}(q)P_{it} \cdot g_{t} + x_{it} \Gamma$$
  
Global FCI

- **CFMs** and **FXIs** are more likely to be used to lean against shocks to **external** financial conditions
- Modify quantile regressions to examine global FCI (g) and proceed the loss function analysis for non-US sample
- U.S. FCI is used as a **global FCI**, which is exogenous

### Macroprudential policy tightening reduces losses, but other policies do not

	Global FCI					
	$\omega_{y}=0.542$		ω <sub>γ</sub> =0.542,			
	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	$\omega_p$ =1			
MPM All	-0.112 ***	-0.107 ***	-0.104 ***			
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.107 ***	-0.101 ***	-0.096 ***			
MPM FI-Based	-0.068 ***	-0.067 ***	-0.065 ***			
MP	0.038 *	0.036 *	0.036 *			
FXI	-0.022	-0.021	-0.021			
CFM	-0.039	-0.034	-0.030			

Notes: Changes in losses by tightening *P*, in percent of losses without policy ( $L_o(\Theta, P = 0)$ ). Confidence bands in brackets. Inference based on cluster bootstrap. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means significance at 10, 5, 1 percent levels.

### **Effects may Depend on Vulnerabilities**

- Effect of some policies may depend on level of financial vulnerabilities
- For example, effect of a loosening of financial conditions may be amplified when financial sector leverage is high.
- Alternatively, tightening policies may be beneficial when private sector leverage is low (build resilience), but not when leverage is already high
- Augment quantile regressions and proceed as before

 $\begin{aligned} Q_{\Delta y_{i,t,t+h}}(q|Z_{it}) &= \alpha_{0i}^{h}(q) + \beta_{1}^{h}(q)\Delta y_{it} + \beta_{2}^{h}(q)f_{it} + \beta_{3}^{h}(q)P_{it} + \beta_{4}^{h}(q)P_{it} \times f_{it} \\ &+ (\beta_{6}^{h} + \beta_{7}^{h}(q)f_{it} + \beta_{8}^{h}(q)P_{it} + \beta_{9}^{h}(q)P_{it} \times f_{it}) \times CGDP_{it}, \\ &h = 1, \dots, H, \ q = 0.05, \dots, 0.95 \end{aligned}$ 

#### Effects do Depend on Vulnerabilities

Tightening borrower-based macropru → stronger loss reduction if credit is high. Tightening financial-institutions-based macropru → larger benefits when credit is still low,; does not have significant effects when credit is already high.

	Low Credit		High Credit			
	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>y</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>γ</sub> =0.542,	ω <sub>y</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>y</sub> =0.542,
	· · ·		ω <sub>p</sub> =1			ω <sub>p</sub> =1
MPM All	-0.089 **	-0.086 **	-0.084 **	-0.099 **	-0.094 **	-0.090 **
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.033	-0.032	-0.031	-0.083 ***	-0.078 ***	-0.075 ***
MPM FI-Based	-0.076 **	-0.072 **	-0.070 **	-0.028	-0.027	-0.026
MP	0.137 ***	0.132 ***	0.129 ***	0.126 ***	0.120 ***	0.115 ***

### Results are robust to alternative setups

- Alternative loss functions (Appendix 1)
  - Linear-quadratic loss function to address level effects
  - Linex loss function to consider asymmetric preferences
- Alternative monetary policy shocks (Appendix 2)
  - High-frequency identification around policy announcements
- Advanced economies vs. Emerging market economies (Appendix 3)

# Summary

### How should countries lean against the wind?

- New empirical approach, going beyond the tail risks
  - Estimate policy effects on the entire future distributions with quantile regressions
  - Evaluate the net benefit of each policy with **loss functions**
- **Results** suggest leaning against loose financial conditions is...
  - **Beneficial** with macroprudential policy
  - Not beneficial with monetary policy
  - Only small net benefits with CFMs and FXIs

# Thank you!

### Appendix 1: Robustness to Alternative Loss Functions. MPMs reduce losses, but not other policies.

	External Shock				
	Linear-qua	Asymmetric			
	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0			
MPM All	-0.100 ***	-0.095 ***	-0.109 ***		
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.097 ***	-0.089 ***	-0.100 ***		
MPM FI-Based	-0.060 **	-0.058 **	-0.067 ***		
MP	0.046 **	0.044 **	0.040 *		
FXI	-0.029	-0.027 *	-0.024		
CFM	-0.040	-0.033	-0.041		

Notes: Reductions in losses by tightening *P*, in percent of losses without policy ( $L_o(\Theta, P = 0)$ ). Confidence bands in brackets. Inference based on cluster bootstrap. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means significance at 10, 5, 1 percent levels.

### Appendix 2: Robustness to Alternative Monetary Policy Shock. Monetary policy is not helpful.

	Domestic FCI		External FCI			
	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>y</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>y</sub> =0.542, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>y</sub> =0.542, ω <sub>p</sub> =1
MPM All	-0.089 ***	· -0.085 ***	-0.083 ***	-0.112 ***	* -0.107 ***	-0.104 ***
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.100 ***	· -0.068 ***	-0.065 ***	-0.107 ***	* -0.101 ***	-0.096 ***
MPM FI-Based	-0.053 **	-0.036 **	-0.035 **	-0.068 ***	* -0.067 ***	-0.065 ***
MP	0.121 ***	• 0.115 ***	0.111 ***	0.038 *	0.036 *	0.036 *
FXI	-	-	-	-0.022	-0.021	-0.021
CFM	-	-	-	-0.039	-0.034	-0.030
HF MP	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.025	-0.023	-0.022

Notes: Reductions in losses by tightening *P*, in percent of losses without policy ( $L_o(\Theta, P = 0)$ ). Confidence bands in brackets. Inference based on cluster bootstrap. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means significance at 10, 5, 1 percent levels. HF MP: High-frequency monetary policy shocks.

### Appendix 3: Results are similar. Advanced Economies vs. Emerging Market Economies

	Domestic FCI		External FCI			
	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>y</sub> =0.542, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>γ</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =0	ω <sub>y</sub> =1, ω <sub>p</sub> =1	ω <sub>γ</sub> =0.542, ω <sub>p</sub> =1
		Adva	nced economies			
MPM All	-0.120 **	-0.116 **	-0.113 **	-0.139 **	-0.136 **	-0.133 **
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.141 **	-0.136 **	-0.132 *	-0.142 ***	-0.139 ***	-0.136 ***
MPM FI-Based	-0.027	-0.026	-0.025	-0.046	-0.045	-0.045
MP	0.127 ***	0.124 ***	0.122 ***	0.075	0.075	0.075
FXI	-	-	-	0.051	0.049	0.047
CFM	-	-	-	0.015	0.015	0.015
		Eme	rging economies			
MPM All	-0.081 ***	-0.078 ***	-0.075 ***	-0.143 ***	-0.062 ***	-0.038 ***
MPM Borrower-Based	-0.067 **	-0.064 **	-0.061 **	-0.136 *	-0.099 *	-0.089 *
MPM FI-Based	-0.074 **	-0.072 **	-0.070 **	-0.132 ***	-0.125 ***	-0.120 ***
MP	0.086 **	0.080 ***	0.077 ***	0.092 *	0.089 *	0.086 **
FXI	-	-	-	0.017	0.014	0.011
CFM	-	-	-	-0.065 *	-0.050	-0.040

Notes: Reductions in losses by tightening *P*, in percent of losses without policy ( $L_o(\Theta, P = 0)$ ). Confidence bands in brackets. Inference based on cluster bootstrap. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* means significance at 10, 5, 1 percent levels.