# The Cost of ESG Investing

Laura LindseySeth PruittChristoph SchillerASUASUASU

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  - ▶ Fund managers are increasingly looking for ways to integrate ESG goals
  - However, the implications of doing so are unclear
- ▶ Widespread disagreement on the return predictability of ESG characteristics:
  - Yes: Fabozzi et al. [2008], Luo and Balvers [2017], Pedersen et al. [2020], Zerbib [2020], Glossner [2021], Baker et al. [2018], Bolton and Kacperczyk [2020], and Pastor et al. [2021b]
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  - Cheap-talk: Kim and Yoon [2020], Brandon et al. [2021].
- Costs and benefits of ESG integration:
  - Kim and Yoon [2020], Brandon et al. [2021], Ceccarelli et al. [2021], Aragon et al. [2020]
- ▶ *This paper:* Can we form ESG portfolios "for free", and if yes, why?

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- 1. We use IPCA (instrumented PCA) to extract aggregate risks that better-capture the mean-variance-efficient frontier (see Kelly et al. [2019, forthcoming]):
  - Best-possible depiction of systematic risks when we evaluate effect of ESG on average returns
  - Avoid inappropriately attributing them to an alpha because one's factor model is poor
- 2. Explicitly allow for ESG measures and other firm characteristics to drive cross-sectional and time-series variation in alphas, betas, or both.
  - ▶ Do ESG ratings identify systematic (conditional) risk exposures or exploitable mispricing?
- 3. Take into account a large amount of the conditioning information investors have at their disposal *already* in addition to ESG scores.
- 4. Use data from four major ESG providers (and evaluate both aggregate and subcomponent performance) in our empirical analysis

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# Take aways

Can adjust systematic portfolio to achieve ESG mandate with minimal effect on profits

Simple ESG screens or model-implied optimal portfolios

(of course depends on strength of ESG screening)

- Why? ESG measures do not predict returns
  - $\blacktriangleright \ {\sf Not} \ \alpha$
  - Not β

within the context of rich conditioning information available to investors

- Consistent with equilibrium theory
  - ▶ as different ESG-minded investors use different ESG measures, and those measures disagree

### The IPCA model

Conditional, time-varying alpha, beta

 $r_{n,t+1} = \alpha_{n,t} + \beta'_{n,t}f_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{n,t+1}, \text{ where } \alpha_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\alpha}z_{n,t} \text{ and } \beta_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\beta}z_{n,t}$ 

- $z_{n,t}$  vector of firm-characteristics ( $L \times 1$ )
- $\beta_{n,t}$  instrument for with characteristics  $(\Gamma'_{\beta} z_{n,t}) \Rightarrow$  conditional exposures
- $\alpha_{n,t}$  instrument for with characteristics  $(\Gamma'_{\alpha} z_{n,t}) \Rightarrow$  conditional alpha
  - $f_t$  estimated factors ( $K \times 1$ )  $\Rightarrow$  Kelly et al. [2019, 2021, forthcoming] show that estimating factors produces arge gains relative to well-known factors [Hou et al., 2015, Fama and French, 2015] for stocks and bonds
  - Output:  $\beta_{n,t}$ , moments of  $f, \epsilon \Rightarrow$  tangency portfolio, model-implied moments of  $r_{t+1}$

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# ESG strategies in practice



Source: GSIA (2019)

Figure: From Dimson et al. [2020]

# ESG strategies in the IPCA framework

$$r_{n,t+1} = \alpha_{n,t} + \beta'_{n,t} f_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{n,t+1}, \text{ where } \alpha_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\alpha} z_{n,t} \text{ and } \beta_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\beta} z_{n,t}$$

Tilted systematic portfolios: impose  $\Gamma_{\alpha} = 0$  (\* IPCA ESG Overlay)

- ► Adjust portfolio for an ESG mandate, *after* model estimation ⇔ ESG screening
- 1. (Tangency ptf) + (Screen "bad" or "good" ESG) = ESG-tilted tangency ptf 2. (Model-implied moments of  $r_{t+1}$ ) = ESG-tilted Markowitz ptf Use Pedersen et al. [202]
- +(Responsible-investing model)  $\equiv$  ESG-tilted Markowitz ptr and Pastor et al. [

#### Non-systematic portfolios: Allow ${\sf \Gamma}_lpha eq 0$ $\stackrel{ ext{ esc in IPCA model}}{ ext{ model}}$

- ▶ Include ESG in  $z_{n,t}$  in model like other firm characteristics  $\Leftrightarrow$  ESG integration
- 1.  $\Gamma_{\alpha} = 0$  and  $\beta$ (other chars, ESG): better mean-variance frontier?
- 2.  $\alpha$ (other chars, ESG): *pure-alpha portfolio* performance [Kelly et al., 2019]?
- 3.  $\beta$ (other chars),  $\alpha$ (ESG): profitable *beta-neutral portfolio*?

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#### Data

- Non-ESG data: CRSP and Compustat via the codes provided by Jensen et al. [forthcoming]. Non-ESG Data
  - ▶ 50 characteristics, based on those that provide the greatest firm-month coverage.
  - ▶ In robustness check: subset of 17 that are "slow" (small time-series vol)
- ESG data: 4 major ESG data providers (KLD, Asset4, Sustainalytics, RepRisk).
  - Coverage varies widely across data providers and time ESG Data 1
  - ESG data availability much better for large firms \*\* ESG Data 2 \*\* ESG Data 3
  - ► Main tests focus on sample of *large firms* (Kelly et al. [2019] show lower systematic-investment profits in large firms ⇒ more stringent test of effects of ESG)

▶ All measures (ESG and Non-ESG) rank-demeaned to [-0.5, 0.5] so mean/median equals 0

Tangency portfolio of large firms, no ESG overlay:

- ▶ Result consistent with Kelly et al. [2019]
- Annualized Sharpe ratio and mean, and excess kurtosis and skewness of the monthly returns for tangency portfolio (large firms only, *t*-Statistics in parentheses)

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18

Negative/exclusionary				
ESG integration				
Corporate engagement				
Norms-based screening				
Positive screening				
Sustainability investing Impact investing				
USD trillions	)	5 1	0	15
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 $\blacktriangleright\,$  ESG Mandate: Negative Screening  $\#1 \Rightarrow$  exclude firms below given ESG score

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18
Exclude firms b	elow p	o <sub>25</sub> ESG	score:			
KLD	1.48	(2.34)	14.79	(7.35)	2.36	0.46
Asset4	1.39	(2.19)	13.84	(6.70)	2.70	0.03
Sustainalytics	1.42	(2.25)	14.22	(7.04)	2.04	0.19
RepRisk	1.53	(2.42)	15.31	(7.63)	2.21	0.45

 $\blacktriangleright$  ESG Mandate: Negative Screening  $\#2 \Rightarrow$  do not go long 'bad' ESG firms

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18
Exclude firms b	pelow p	o <sub>25</sub> ESG	score i	n long-le	eg only:	
KLD	1.43	(2.25)	14.26	(7.06)	2.21	0.39
Asset4	1.40	(2.21)	13.98	(6.79)	2.33	0.37
Sustainalytics	1.41	(2.22)	14.07	(6.90)	2.24	0.19
RepRisk	1.50	(2.37)	15.01	(7.45)	2.20	0.45

► ESG Mandate: Positive Screening ⇒ only invest in 'good' ESG firms (i.e. zero-out firms with missing ESG scores)

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18
Exclude firms r	ot-abc	ove p <sub>50</sub>	ESG sc	ore:		
KLD	1.14	(1.81)	11.41	(6.71)	1.99	0.0
Asset4	0.59	(0.93)	5.85	(2.96)	7.47	0.25
Sustainalytics	0.65	(1.02)	6.45	(3.40)	14.03	2.2
RepRisk	0.62	(0.98)	6.17	(3.36)	7.03	0.3

Responsible-investment model: Pedersen et al. [2020]

- Firms with ESG score above targeted average ESG score ( $\bar{s}$ ) receive higher ptf weight
- ► Portfolio weights:  $w_{PFP,t} = \Sigma_t^{-1} \left( \mu_t + \pi_t (s_t \iota_{N_t} \bar{s}) \right)$

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18
Missing ESG as	: <i>0,                                   </i>	= 0.25 :				
KLD	1.49	(2.25)	14.86	(7.26)	1.87	-0.05
Asset4	1.17	(1.33)	11.71	(4.50)	1.68	-0.45
Sustainalytics	1.83	(1.45)	18.24	(6.23)	0.68	0.19
RepRisk	1.17	(1.15)	11.66	(3.90)	1.47	-0.48

Responsible-investment models: Pastor et al. [2021a]

- ▶ Investor's 'taste' for ESG ( $d \ge 0$ ) determines weight of firm in portfolio
- ► Portfolio weights:  $w_{PST,t} = \Sigma_t^{-1} (\mu_t + ds_t)$

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
No ESG Tilt	1.46	(2.30)	14.58	(7.29)	1.96	0.18
Missing ESG as	: 0, d =	= 0.001	:			
KLD	1.36	(2.15)	13.60	(7.11)	1.12	-0.16
Asset4	1.36	(2.14)	13.54	(7.13)	1.59	-0.14
Sustainalytics	1.42	(2.24)	14.20	(7.45)	1.53	0.01
RepRisk	1.47	(2.31)	14.65	(7.65)	1.09	0.03

#### Robustness

ESG as an overlay

- Alternative ESG thresholds, model parameters "Tilts Pedersen et al. (2020) Pastor et al. (2021a)
- Subcomponents (E, S, G) Robustness E, S, G
- ▶ Only nonmissing; imputed 0 or -0.5 → Robustness Imputation
- Best-in-class industry adjustment Industry adjustment
- Fewer "slow" characteristics; recent data post 2010 Post 2010

There are numerous ways to overlay a profitable systematic portfolio with an ESG mandate and sacrifice (close to) nothing:

- ▶ Sharpe ratios and average returns can remain high and statistically significant
- ESG overlay portfolios are net-long, have high diversification, and higher median ESG scores than tangency portfolio (\*\* Properties Portfolio Overlays)

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In alpha, or beta, or both



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ESG integration *only* in  $\beta$ :

 $\blacktriangleright \ r_{n,t+1} = \beta'_{n,t} f_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{n,t+1}, \quad \text{where } \Gamma_{\alpha} = 0 \text{ and } \beta_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\beta} z_{n,t}$ 

Systematic portfolio ( $\Gamma_{\alpha} = 0$ ), include ESG scores with other characteristics in  $z_{n,t}$ .

	SR		Mean	
Large firms, no ESG	1.46	(2.30)	14.57	(7.28)
Large firms, missing ES(	G as 0,	5-factors,	$\Gamma_{\alpha} = 0.$	
KLD	1.41	(2.23)	14.13	(7.17)
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In alpha, or beta, or both

ESG integration in  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  (pure-alpha):

$$\blacktriangleright r_{n,t+1} = \alpha_{n,t} + \beta'_{n,t} f_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{n,t+1}, \text{ where } \alpha_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\alpha} z_{n,t} \text{ and } \beta_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\beta} z_{n,t}$$

z includes ESG and other characteristics.

	SR		Mean				
Large firms, no ESG	0.18	(0.29)	1.82	(1.01)			
Large firms, missing ESG as 0, 5-factors, $\Gamma_{\alpha} \neq 0$ :							
KLD	-0.08	(-0.11)	-0.75	(-0.37)			
Asset4	0.12	(0.13)	1.16	(0.45)			
Sustainalytics	0.38	(0.30)	3.76	(1.12)			
RepRisk	0.24	(0.23)	2.36	(0.77)			

In alpha, or beta, or both

ESG integration in only  $\alpha$  (beta-neutral):

 $\blacktriangleright r_{n,t+1} = \alpha_{n,t} + \beta'_{n,t} f_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{n,t+1}, \text{ where } \alpha_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\alpha} \zeta_{n,t} \text{ and } \beta_{n,t} = \Gamma'_{\beta} z_{n,t}$ 

•  $\zeta$  includes ESG scores, z includes other characteristics.

	SR		Mean				
Large firms, missing ESG as 0, 5-factors, $\Gamma_{\alpha} \neq 0$ :							
KLD	0.20	(0.32)	2.03	(1.04)			
Asset4	0.06	(0.09)	0.60	(0.33)			
Sustainalytics	0.03	(0.05)	0.34	(0.19)			
RepRisk	0.20	(0.32)	2.01	(1.03)			

### Robustness

ESG in the model

- Alternative configurations, imputations for missing values Probustness missing values
- Subcomponents (E, S, G)
- Best-in-class industry adjustment

➡ Robustness: tangency ptf → Robustness: beta-neutral

- Other FF model specs Probustness beta Probustness alpha
- ▶ Fewer "slow" characteristics; recent data from 2010-

Taken together, the results cast doubt on the idea that ESG scores are useful for *creating* profitable portfolio strategies:

- ▶ No role for ESG scores in determining firms' beta
- ▶ No evidence that they define alpha with respect to successful asset-pricing factors

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- Other FF model specs (\* Robustness beta) (\* Robustness alpha) ►
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# Relation to other empirical results

E dimension: Pastor et al. [2021b] construct "green" factor

- ► Find Fama-French alpha over 2012–2020
- ▶ Argue this reflects unexpected climate-concern shocks, not reliable alpha going forward

S dimension: Edmans [2011] constructs "employment satisfaction" factor

- Finds Carhart [1997] alpha over 1984-2009.
- Argues that financial markets under-appreciate the importance of employment satisfaction.
- We successfully replicate both papers using Fama-French (Carhart) risk factors: unconditional alpha Pastor et al. (2021b) result
  Edimans (2011) result
- ▶ However, we find no reliable *conditional alpha* in IPCA model (beta-neutral portfolios)
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### Relation to theory

ESG measures don't reliably predict returns  $\Rightarrow$  we can use them to overlay well-performing portfolios without reduction in performance

- But if every investor does this, what is the equilibrium effect?
- ▶ Won't 'bad' ESG stock prices fall, expected returns rise, and ESG begin to predict returns?
ESG measures don't reliably predict returns  $\Rightarrow$  we can use them to overlay well-performing portfolios without reduction in performance

- But if every investor does this, what is the equilibrium effect?
- ▶ Won't 'bad' ESG stock prices fall, expected returns rise, and ESG begin to predict returns?

#### No, not necessarily

- Our extensive results show: no one way to "do ESG"
- ▶ Different investors may use *different measures* and have *different ESG mandates*
- Extension of Pastor et al. [2021a] model: expected returns may be unaffected by ESG concerns when ESG scores are uncorrelated \* Pastor et al. (2021a) extension



Figure: Densities of cross-sectional rank correlations



- ESG measures are essentially randomly related—don't agree
- ▶ In a Pastor et al. [2021a] type model: no equilibrium effect on E(r)

 $\Rightarrow$  Even if investors act as promised, the plethora of ESG metrics and ESG mandates can lead to negligible equilibrium effects

- Professional portfolio-managers have incentives to advertise good ESG performance
- One might expect many ESG measures and measure-providers to flourish

# Conclusion

> Can adjust portfolio to achieve ESG mandate with minimal effect on profits

Simple ESG screens or model-implied optimal portfolios

(of course depends on strength of ESG screening)

- ESG measures do not predict returns
  - $\blacktriangleright \ {\sf Not} \ \alpha$
  - ▶ Not  $\beta$

within the context of rich conditioning information available to investors

- Consistent with equilibrium theory
  - ▶ as different ESG-minded investors use different ESG measures, and those measures disagree

# Appendix Slides

# Including ESG: As an overlay/tilt

*Overlay*: adjust portfolio for an ESG-investing mandate, not as part of mean/cov estimation Unadjusted Tangency

- Factor portfolios: W<sub>f,t</sub> = (β'<sub>t</sub>β<sub>t</sub>)<sup>-1</sup> β'<sub>t</sub>
  Factor tangency portfolio: w<sub>factan</sub> = <sup>1</sup>/<sub>t'<sub>K</sub>S<sup>-1</sup>m</sub>S<sup>-1</sup>m (E(f) = m, Cov(f) = S)
  ⇒ w'<sub>tan,t</sub> = w'<sub>factan</sub>W<sub>f,t</sub>
- 1. Screened tangency
  - **EXAMPLE** Zero-out  $w_{i,tan,t}$  where firm *i*'s ESG is below  $p_Q$
  - In either leg, or only in long leg
- 2. Pedersen et al. [2020] optimal portfolio

 $w_{PFP,t} = \Sigma_t^{-1} \left( \mu_t + \pi_t (s_t - \iota_{N_t} \overline{s}) \right)$ 

for  $s_t$  ESG scores,  $\bar{s}$  avg,  $\mu = E(r), \Sigma = Cov(r)$ ,  $\pi_t$  function of parameters

3. Pastor et al. [2021a] optimal portfolio  $w_{PST,t} = \Sigma_t^{-1} (\mu_t + ds_t)$ , for  $d \ge 0$  ESG taste

Model estimates:  $\mu_t = \beta_t E(f), \Sigma_t = \beta_t \Sigma_F \beta'_t + \Sigma_\epsilon$ 

(e.g. Q = 50%)



# Including ESG: In the IPCA model

Like any other characteristic

- ▶ Is ESG in  $\beta_{n,t}$ ?
- ▶ Is ESG in  $\alpha_{n,t}$ ?
- How does ESG data change the estimates?

 $\alpha_{n,t}$  makes a profitable "pure-alpha" portfolio (no factor exposure)? [Kelly et al., 2019]

#### <u>Just in $\alpha$ </u>

- Modified estimator:
  - $r_{n,t+1} = \zeta_{n,t}' \Gamma_{\alpha} + z_{n,t}' \Gamma_{\beta} f_{t+1}$
- Define a "beta-neutral" portfolio (no factor exposure)

for ESG  $\zeta$  *not* in *z* 



#### Non-ESG Data

CRSP and Compustat via the codes provided by [Jensen et al., forthcoming]

- 50 characteristics, based on those that provide the greatest firm-month coverage
- market\_equity and assets
- cash-flow variables net\_income, sales
- pay-out ratios eqnpo\_1m, eqnpo\_3m, eqnpo\_6m, eqnpo\_12m, ni\_at
- change in shares chcsho\_1m, chcsho\_3m, chcsho\_6m, chcsho\_12m
- 🕨 valuation ratios div3m\_me, div6m\_me, div12m\_me, at\_me, ni\_me, nix\_me, sale\_me, xido\_at
- leverage ratios debt\_me, netdebt\_me, debt\_at
- turnover, trading, and volume variables tvol, zero\_trades\_21d, zero\_trades\_126d, dolvol\_126d, turnover\_126d, dolvol\_var\_126d, turnover\_var\_126d, zero\_trades\_252d, bidaskhl\_21d, rvolhl\_21d
- past return variables ret\_1\_0, ret\_2\_0, ret\_3\_0, ret\_3\_1, ret\_6\_0, ret\_6\_1, ret\_9\_0, ret\_9\_1, ret\_12\_0, ret\_12\_1, ret\_12\_7
- quality-minus-junk qmj\_safety, qmj\_prof
- other variables seas\_1\_1an, age, mispricing\_perf.

# Available ESG observations over time



## Firm size and KLD ESG availability



#### Firm size and ESG availability

Panel A. KLD



Panel C. Sustainalytics



#### Panel B. Asset4



Panel D. RepRisk



# Robustness - ESG Tilts: Alternative Thresholds

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
Panel B: KLD						
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.52	(2.39)	15.15	(7.52)	3.86	0.76
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG	1.39	(2.20)	13.90	(6.48)	6.24	1.10
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG in long-leg	1.25	(1.97)	12.49	(6.17)	2.76	0.19
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG in long-leg	0.78	(1.23)	7.75	(3.78)	1.73	-0.00
Panel C: Asset4						
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.34	(2.12)	13.39	(6.29)	3.05	0.28
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG	1.31	(2.06)	13.04	(5.99)	3.77	0.67
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG in long-leg	1.22	(1.93)	12.20	(5.84)	2.38	0.47
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG in long-leg	0.96	(1.52)	9.62	(4.63)	1.75	0.23
Panel D: Sustainalytics						
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.37	(2.17)	13.71	(6.65)	2.32	0.23
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG	1.33	(2.10)	13.31	(6.34)	2.70	0.30
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG in long-leg	1.31	(2.07)	13.06	(6.28)	2.36	0.24
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG in long-leg	1.17	(1.85)	11.72	(5.59)	1.91	0.25
Panel E: RepRisk						
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.51	(2.38)	15.06	(7.33)	2.75	0.60
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG	1.46	(2.31)	14.59	(6.99)	2.93	0.66
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG in long-leg	1.37	(2.17)	13.72	(6.61)	2.47	0.4
zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{75}$ ESG in long-leg	1.26	(1.98)	12.55	(5.99)	2.17	0.44

#### Robustness – Responsible-investing models: Pedersen et al. (2020)

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
Panel B: KLD						
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = 0$	1.49	(2.25)	14.87	(7.25)	1.94	-0.03
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.46	(2.20)	14.58	(7.08)	2.03	-0.01
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0$	1.51	(2.28)	15.08	(7.44)	1.81	0.04
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.49	(2.26)	14.92	(7.29)	1.91	-0.01
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0.25$	1.51	(2.28)	15.04	(7.47)	1.73	0.08
Panel C: Asset4						
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = 0$	1.18	(1.34)	11.74	(4.50)	1.51	-0.43
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.16	(1.31)	11.53	(4.39)	1.43	-0.43
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0$	1.19	(1.35)	11.85	(4.54)	1.68	-0.47
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.16	(1.32)	11.60	(4.44)	1.56	-0.45
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0.25$	1.20	(1.36)	11.94	(4.56)	1.84	-0.49
Panel D: Sustainalytics						
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = 0$	1.86	(1.47)	18.49	(6.23)	0.75	0.17
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $ar{s}=-0.25$	1.86	(1.47)	18.48	(6.12)	0.78	0.16
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0$	1.87	(1.48)	18.56	(6.34)	0.71	0.17
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.86	(1.47)	18.53	(6.21)	0.72	0.13
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0.25$	1.85	(1.47)	18.45	(6.40)	0.68	0.20
Panel E: RepRisk						
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = 0$	1.16	(1.14)	11.58	(3.87)	1.54	-0.50
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.13	(1.11)	11.29	(3.75)	1.64	-0.54
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0$	1.17	(1.15)	11.68	(3.90)	1.52	-0.49
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = -0.25$	1.15	(1.13)	11.46	(3.82)	1.61	-0.52
Large, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0.25$	1.18	(1.16)	11.78	(3.94)	1.44	-0.47

# Robustness – Responsible-investing models: Pastor et al. (2021)

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
Panel B: KLD						
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.01$	0.35	(0.56)	3.51	(1.85)	1.91	-0.29
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.0001$	1.49	(2.35)	14.89	(7.71)	1.83	-0.02
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.01$	0.17	(0.22)	1.70	(0.76)	0.25	0.05
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.001$	1.26	(2.00)	12.63	(6.95)	1.16	0.15
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.0001$	1.50	(2.36)	14.97	(7.81)	1.74	0.04
Panel C: Asset4						
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.01$	0.36	(0.56)	3.55	(1.89)	3.88	-0.26
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.0001$	1.48	(2.34)	14.81	(7.68)	1.91	-0.02
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.01$	0.52	(0.58)	5.15	(1.83)	0.31	-0.20
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.001$	1.37	(2.17)	13.70	(7.01)	1.99	-0.25
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.0001$	1.49	(2.35)	14.87	(7.69)	1.95	-0.03
Panel D: Sustainalytics						
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.01$	0.48	(0.76)	4.82	(2.59)	6.46	-0.23
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.0001$	1.48	(2.34)	14.83	(7.68)	1.88	-0.01
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.01$	0.16	(0.13)	1.63	(0.41)	0.35	0.02
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.001$	1.30	(2.05)	12.97	(6.68)	1.67	0.02
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.0001$	1.48	(2.33)	14.74	(7.63)	1.91	-0.01
Panel E: RepRisk						
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.01$	0.68	(0.91)	6.78	(2.61)	9.92	-0.79
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.0001$	1.50	(2.36)	14.93	(7.73)	1.84	0.00
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.01$	-0.28	(-0.12)	-2.78	(-0.33)	-0.71	-0.22
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.001$	1.36	(2.14)	13.55	(6.86)	0.90	0.02
Large, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.0001$	1.49	(2.35)	14.90	(7.71)	1.81	0.01

# Robustness – ESG as a tilt

Subindices, all firms, industry-adjustment, post-2010

	SR		Mean		Kurtosis	Skewness
All firms	4.08	(6.28)	40.75	(16.35)	0.89	0.23
All firms, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	4.12	(6.33)	41.11	(15.63)	0.84	0.40
All firms, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG in long-leg	3.92	(6.05)	39.15	(15.38)	0.53	0.25
All firms, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ not-above $p_{50}$ ESG	1.01	(1.59)	10.07	(5.31)	14.79	-1.34
All firms, PFP optimal, missing ESG as 0, $\bar{s} = 0$	3.26	(4.85)	32.50	(13.68)	2.42	0.12
All firms, PFP optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $\bar{s} = 0$	3.19	(4.75)	31.82	(14.05)	2.68	0.31
All firms, PST optimal, missing ESG as 0, $d = 0.001$	2.88	(4.50)	28.78	(12.82)	2.46	-0.01
All firms, PST optimal, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , $d = 0.001$	2.67	(4.17)	26.70	(13.19)	2.78	0.32
Large, Total ind. adj., zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.44	(2.27)	14.38	(6.92)	4.56	0.83
Large, E, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.52	(2.40)	15.18	(7.66)	2.28	0.45
Large, S, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.55	(2.44)	15.45	(7.74)	3.30	0.62
Large, G, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	1.46	(2.31)	14.61	(7.23)	2.09	0.24
All firms, Total ind. adj., zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	4.01	(6.17)	40.00	(14.67)	0.80	0.45
All firms, E, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	4.14	(6.37)	41.39	(16.31)	0.92	0.28
All firms, S, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	4.07	(6.27)	40.65	(15.56)	0.84	0.39
All firms, G, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	4.11	(6.32)	41.03	(16.25)	0.88	0.26
Large, 2010-	1.98	(1.80)	19.72	(7.04)	0.82	-0.30
Large, 2010-, zero-out w <sub>tan,t</sub> below p <sub>50</sub> ESG	1.73	(1.58)	17.24	(7.15)	0.09	-0.43
All firms, 2010-	2.89	(2.61)	28.81	(10.07)	1.39	-0.14
All firms, 2010-, zero-out $w_{tan,t}$ below $p_{50}$ ESG	2.87	(2.59)	28.58	(10.16)	2.47	0.26

Panel A









Panel D







Panel A





Panel B

Panel C





Panel D





#### Robustness - ESG in the model: As beta and pure-alpha

	$R^2$		Fa	ictor			Pure-	alpha	
		SR		Mean		SR		Mean	
	P	anel A							
Large, 5-factor restricted	31.0	1.46	(2.30)	14.57	(7.28)				
Large, 5-factor unrestricted	31.1					0.18	(0.29)	1.82	(1.01)
	Pane	B: KL	D						
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.1	1.36	(2.15)	13.62	(6.97)				
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor unrestricted	31.2					0.19	(0.28)	1.85	(0.98)
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor restricted	32.8	1.16	(1.76)	11.59	(6.43)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor unrestricted	32.9					0.24	(0.36)	2.40	(1.27)
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor restricted	32.9	1.16	(1.75)	11.55	(6.39)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor unrestricted	33.0					0.16	(0.25)	1.62	(0.85)
	Panel	C: Ass	et4						
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.0	1.47	(2.32)	14.68	(7.28)				
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor unrestricted	31.1					-0.07	(-0.08)	-0.69	(-0.27
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor restricted	35.2	1.33	(1.51)	13.23	(5.77)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor unrestricted	35.2					0.32	(0.37)	3.20	(1.28)
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor restricted	35.2	1.31	(1.49)	13.09	(5.67)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor unrestricted	35.3					0.34	(0.39)	3.37	(1.36)
	Panel D:	Sustain	alytics						
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.0	1.47	(2.32)	14.69	(7.31)				
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor unrestricted	31.1					-0.10	(-0.08)	-1.00	(-0.28
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor restricted	35.9	1.90	(1.50)	18.91	(6.60)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor unrestricted	36.0					0.37	(0.30)	3.69	(1.04)
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor restricted	36.0	1.89	(1.50)	18.82	(6.59)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor unrestricted	36.1					0.37	(0.30)	3.71	(1.05)
		E: Repl							
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.0	1.58	(2.49)	15.76	(8.65)				
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor unrestricted	31.1					-0.38	(-0.38)	-3.81	(-1.33)
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor restricted	35.8	1.51	(1.48)	15.01	(5.97)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, 5-factor unrestricted	35.9					-0.30	(-0.30)	-3.00	(-1.04
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor restricted	35.8	1.51	(1.48)	15.03	(5.97)				
Large, ESG nonmissing, ESG included, 5-factor unrestricted	35.9					-0.30	(-0.30)	-2.99	(-1.04)

## Robustness – ESG in the model as beta (using KLD)

	$R^2$		Fa	actor	
		SR		Mean	
Panel A. KLD					
Large, FF5C restricted	28.6	1.14	(1.80)	11.38	(6.37
Large, missing ESG as -0.5, FF5C restricted	28.6	1.14	(1.79)	11.34	(6.35
All firms, 5-factor restricted	16.4	4.08	(6.28)	40.75	(16.35
All firms, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	16.4	4.08	(6.28)	40.76	(16.34
All firms, FF5C restricted	13.7	3.51	(5.45)	35.08	(15.57
All firms, missing ESG as -0.5, FF5C restricted	13.7	3.49	(5.41)	34.84	(15.46
Large, Total ind. adj., missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.1	1.41	(2.22)	14.07	(7.11
Large, E, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.1	1.39	(2.19)	13.84	(7.00
Large, S, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.1	1.38	(2.18)	13.81	(7.04
Large, G, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	31.1	1.46	(2.31)	14.60	(7.28
Large, Slow, 5-factor restricted	28.1	1.10	(1.74)	11.03	(6.12
Large, Slow, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , 5-factor restricted	28.1	1.19	(1.88)	11.92	(6.56
Large, Slow, FF5C restricted	26.0	0.65	(1.03)	6.51	(3.64
Large, Slow, missing ESG as -0.5, FF5C restricted	26.0	0.65	(1.03)	6.47	(3.62
All firms, Slow, 5-factor restricted	13.5	3.54	(5.48)	35.31	(15.08
All firms, Slow, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	13.5	3.53	(5.48)	35.28	(15.08
All firms, Slow, FF5C restricted	10.9	2.99	(4.66)	29.85	(14.49
All firms, Slow, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , FF5C restricted	10.9	2.98	(4.65)	29.79	(14.51
Panel B. Large, 2010-					
5-factor restricted	33.0	1.98	(1.80)	19.72	(7.04
KLD Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , 5-factor restricted	33.1	1.98	(1.81)	19.75	(7.04
Asset4 Total, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.98	(1.80)	19.67	(7.03
Sustainalytics Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.97	(1.79)	19.63	(6.91
RepRisk Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$ , 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.97	(1.79)	19.60	(6.99
Uncontroversial Total, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.99	(1.81)	19.80	(7.06
Asset4 Policy Total, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.98	(1.80)	19.68	(7.03
Sustainalytics Policy Total, missing ESG as -0.5, 5-factor restricted	33.0	1.99	(1.81)	19.82	(6.96

# Robustness – ESG in the model as only alpha (beta-neutral)

	Sharp	pe ratio	М	ean
Panel A. Kl	.D			
Large, FF5C, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.20	(0.31)	1.96	(1.09)
Large, FF5C, missing ESG as 0	0.20	(0.31)	1.97	(1.03)
All firms, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.39	(0.62)	3.94	(2.09)
All firms, missing ESG as 0	-0.03	(-0.04)	-0.26	(-0.13)
All firms, FF5C, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.60	(0.95)	6.00	(3.09)
All firms, FF5C, missing ESG as 0	0.05	(0.08)	0.51	(0.25)
Large, Total ind. adj., missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.10	(0.16)	0.98	(0.52)
Large, E, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.05	(0.07)	0.47	(0.26)
Large, S, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.10	(0.17)	1.05	(0.56)
Large, G, missing ESG as $-0.5$	-0.21	(-0.33)	-2.06	(-1.04)
Large, Slow, Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.10	(0.17)	1.05	(0.57)
All firms, Slow, Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.02	(0.03)	0.18	(0.10)
Panel B. Large,	2010-			
KLD Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.63	(0.58)	6.32	(1.89)
Asset4 Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.13	(0.12)	1.30	(0.37)
Sustainalytics Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.47	(0.43)	4.71	(1.37)
RepRisk Total, missing ESG as -0.5	0.55	(0.51)	5.50	(1.89)
Uncontroversial Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$		(0.49)	5.29	(1.47)
Asset4 Policy Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.16	(0.14)	1.56	(0.45)
Sustainalytics Policy Total, missing ESG as $-0.5$	0.69	(0.63)	6.83	(1.93)

# Relation to other empirical results: Pastor et al. [2021b]

Table: Unconditional alpha from regressions

	Intercept	Mkt-RF	SMB	HML	RMW	СМА	Mom	$R^{2}(\%)$
	· · · · ·	· · ·	-0.41 (-10.44)	· · ·	0.00 ( 0.75)	0.02 ( 0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	56.0
FF5C	2.88 (2.43)	0.01 (0.22)	-0.43 ( $-11.65$ )	0.15 (2.64)	-0.06 ( $-0.75$ )	-0.23 ( $-2.93$ )	0.08 (2.39)	63.4

# Relation to other empirical results: Pastor et al. [2021b]

Table: Unconditional alpha from regressions

	Intercept	Mkt-RF	SMB	HML	RMW	СМА	Mom	$R^{2}(\%)$
FF3	3.11 (2.49)	0.01 (0.16)	-0.41 (-10.44)	-0.00 (-0.08)				56.0
FF5C	2.88 (2.43)	0.01 (0.22)	-0.43 (-11.65)	0.15 (2.64)	-0.06 ( $-0.75$ )	-0.23 (-2.93)	0.08 (2.39)	63.4

#### Table: Conditional alpha from beta-neutral portfolios

	Μ	lean	:	SR		
Panel A: FF3						
Missing ESG as 0	3.29	(0.97)	0.33	(0.26)		
Missing ESG as $-0.5$	-2.77	(-0.85)	-0.28	(-0.22)		
ESG nonmissing	2.14	(0.62)	0.22	(0.17)		
	Panel B:	FF5C				
Missing ESG as 0	-0.92	(-0.27)	-0.09	(-0.07)		
Missing ESG as $-0.5$	-1.56	(-0.47)	-0.15	(-0.12)		
ESG nonmissing	0.15	(0.04)	0.02	(0.01)		

# Relation to other empirical results: Edmans [2011]

Table: Unconditional alpha from regressions

	Intercept	Mkt-RF	SMB	HML	RMW	СМА	Mom	$R^{2}(\%)$
FF3	3.32 (2.13)	0.02 (0.67)	-0.17 (-3.26)	-0.38 (-5.52)				19.7
FF5C	5.30 (3.11)	-0.04 (-1.38)	-0.19 ( $-3.64$ )	-0.24 (-3.21)	-0.10 (-1.42)	-0.31 (-2.50)	-0.04 ( $-0.84$ )	23.5

Table: Conditional alpha from beta-neutral portfolios

	Mean	SR
FF3	1.64 (0.78)	0.16 (0.24)
FF3C	-1.75 (-0.83)	-0.18 ( $-0.26$ )
FF5C	-6.85 (-3.11)	-0.69 (-1.00)

Relation to other empirical results

Pastor et al. [2021a]: investor i forms the portfolio

$$w_{i,PST} = \Sigma^{-1}(\mu + d_i \tilde{g}_i)$$

ESG-taste  $d_i \ge 0$ , agent-specific ESG-measure vector  $\tilde{g}_i$ . Market clearing implies

$$\mu = \Sigma w_{mkt,PST} - \bar{d}g$$

- ▶  $\bar{d} = \int_i \omega_i d_i di$ : wealth-weighted average of  $d_i$ ,  $\bar{d} > 0$  if any mass have ESG tastes
- ▶  $g = (1/\bar{d}) \int_i \omega_i d_i \tilde{g}_i di$ : wealth- and ESG-taste-weighted average of  $\tilde{g}_i$
- ▶ If  $\mu = \Sigma w_{mkt,PST}$ , then in the ordinary CAPM world

If g = 0, expected returns can be unaffected by ESG tastes, even if agents have them.



$$g = E_{\omega}( ilde{g}_i) + \textit{Cov}_{\omega}(d_i/ar{d}, ilde{g}_i)$$

- ▶ Pastor et al. [2021a]: Plausible to assume the covariance is zero
- If E<sub>ω</sub>(ğ<sub>i</sub>) = 0, we are saying that the wealth-weighted average ESG score does not distinguish between firms

Relation to theory

$$\boldsymbol{g} = \boldsymbol{E}_{\omega}(\boldsymbol{\tilde{g}}_i) + Cov_{\omega}(d_i/\bar{d}, \boldsymbol{\tilde{g}}_i)$$

- ▶ Pastor et al. [2021a]: Plausible to assume the covariance is zero
- If E<sub>ω</sub>(ğ<sub>i</sub>) = 0, we are saying that the wealth-weighted average ESG score does not distinguish between firms

Consider the rank correlation between measures

- ▶ Correlation of 1: two measures completely agree on firms' ESG ranking
- ▶ Correlation of 0: two measures' rankings not related, their agreement is random

Relation to theory



Figure: Densities of cross-sectional rank correlations





**ESG** measures randomly related  $\Rightarrow$  no equilibrium effect on E(r) [Pastor et al., 2021a]

Relation to theory



► ESG measures randomly related  $\Rightarrow$  no equilibrium effect on E(r) [Pastor et al., 2021a] In line with recent literature [e.g. Berg et al., 2020, Avramov et al., 2021, Christensen et al., 2021, Gibson et al., 2021]

Outside the model, further related issues

- Brandon et al. [2021]: institutional investors ESG scores not better even when they say they take ESG into account: cheap-talk
- Why would institutional investors behave in this way?
  - Riedl and Smeets [2017], Bauer et al. [2021]: social preferences explain ESG adoption, not financial considerations; attract clientele with lower fee-price elasticity
  - Hartzmark and Sussman [2019]: sustainability causes outflows from low-sustainability, inflows to high-sustainability funds





- ESG measures randomly related  $\Rightarrow$  no equilibrium effect on E(r) [Pastor et al., 2021a]
- Professional portfolio-managers have incentives to advertise good ESG performance
- ▶ No definitive rule for how to measure ESG characteristics
- ▶ One might *expect* many ESG measures and measure-providers to flourish
- Even if investors act as promised, the plethora of ESG metrics can lead to negligible equilibrium effects



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