

Discussion of "A Housing Channel of QE Transmission"

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Overview

The perennial question

- ▶ How does monetary policy affect the economy?
- ▶ Effect of change in the short rates on long rates is central to **conventional** monetary policy
 - * Long rate = $\sum E[\text{short rates}] + \text{term premium}$
- ▶ Expansionary **unconventional** monetary policy \Rightarrow long rates fall more than $\sum E[\text{short rates}]$
 - * Flatten the yield curve
 - * Boost credit supply and aggregate demand

Overview

- ▶ On the theory side
 - * Standard rep. agent models: negligible effects
 - "*QE works in practice, but it doesn't work in theory*" – Bernanke (2014)
 - * Recent emphasis on the role of financial intermediaries and the frictions faced (i.e., Gabaix & Maggiori 2015, Koijen & Yogo 2020)
 - * Revives an old literature on portfolio-balance theory (Tobin 1958, Modigliani and Sutch 1966)
- ▶ This paper: propose a novel housing portfolio channel of QE transmission
 - * Introduce risk averse "arbitrageurs" able to invest in both markets of bond and housing
 - * Two-asset version of Vayanos & Vila (2021)

Summary

▶ Theory

- * QE transmission through the housing markets
- * Key mechanism: Household portfolio rebalancing (from bond to housing) in response to the decline in (expected) return

▶ Empirical results

- * Combine Diff-in-Diff with PHF survey dataset to estimate the effect
10% higher bond share \Rightarrow Second home share \uparrow by 1.78–1.95%
- * Price and quantity impact on regional housing market
 \downarrow rental yields and \uparrow house prices

Theoretical Framework

Investors in the model

▶ Classical preferred-habitat view of MP

- * **Friction** that leads to market segmentation (i.e., bond investor clientele)
 - + **Pension funds & insurance firms** demand for **long-maturity** bond to match their liabilities
 - + **Money-market funds** are mandated to hold **short-maturity** bond

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
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▶ Three types of investors in the paper

- * Preferred-habitat investors: local housing [real estate agent] and national bond [?]
- * Cross-market arbitrageurs [local household]
 - + Are they more likely to be FIs (i.e., banks, funds)?

Investors: ballpark estimate in Koijen et al. (2021)

- ▶ For each euro of gov. bonds purchased by ECB
 - * **Net Buyer** ↑: insurance and pension
 - * **Net Seller** ↓: foreign investors, bank and mutual funds



NOTE. The second bar represents average rebalancing of eligible government bond.

Arbitrageurs' risk-bearing capacity


- ▶ Can the arbitrageur **borrow** on long-term to make the arbitrage (in response to fall in yields)
⇒ $h < 0$
- ▶ Or they are faced with certain borrowing constraints (i.e., lack of capital)? ⇒ $h \geq \bar{h}$

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- ▶ Endogenize the wealth of arbitrageurs that crucially determines the risk-bearing capacity
 - * Beyond the trade-off between mean and variance
 - * i.e., CRRA utility so that their risk aversion depends on their current level of wealth (Kekre et al. 2022)
- ▶ An integrated framework to study the joint dynamics of bond and housing pricing without explicitly assuming **$\sigma_{1,2} > 0$**

Household decision

- ▶ The declining and **positive (short-term) deposit interest rate** (NIRP introduced in June 2014)
 - * Having non-zero short rate helps quantify the impact of QE vs rate policy



NOTE. Average interest rate for new deposits, private households, maturities ≤ 1 year, ECB data, in percent.

Housing decision

Table 2: ($\Delta house_{it}$)		(6)
Bonds (x) Post	0.121***	(0.047)
Deposits (x) Post	0.128***	(0.027)

Similar magnitude


- ▶ Durable goods purchase tend to be **lumpy** with large adjustment costs
Haurin and Gill (2002), Lu (2008), McKay and Wieland (2021), ...
- ▶ Portfolio implications
 - * House investment crowds out holding of other fin. assets
 - * Alternative ways to invest in real estate: real estate stock, crowdfunding, or REITs?

Housing decision

- ▶ Extensive vs intensive margin given the low home-ownership
 - * Nest the own-or-rent decision in the household preference $U(\cdot)$

Home Ownership

2016 rates of home ownership in the European Union



Source: Eurostat

Bloomberg

Housing decision - inflation (expectation) channel

- ▶ Impact on inflation
 - * Higher money supply \Rightarrow higher inflation
 - * QE (size standardized to 1% of GDP) raises the price level by 1.42% (Fabo et al, 2021, ...)
- ▶ Impact on inflation expectation
 - * Price inflation expectation \uparrow by 0.22% in response to £ 50 billion of QE (Boneva et al, 2016, ...)
- ▶ Households adjust their investment portfolios to protect against inflation
 - * Lower the overall propensity to save and erode bond portfolios
 - * Portfolio shift towards housing (and equity)

Empirics

Degree of selection within the sample

- ▶ Identification Assumption

Differential responses to QE are solely due to differences in bond holdings

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▶ What are characterized by higher vs low level of bond holding ex-ante?

- * liquidity constraints, preferences (i.e., risk appetite), beliefs (i.e., inflation/income, asset return)

Degree of selection within the sample


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► Inferences are slightly difficult given the **implausibility** of testing the parallel trend assumption



Optimal bond share adjustment

- ▶ Horse-race model with interaction of QE and household characteristics?

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- ▶ Horse-race model with interaction of QE and household characteristics?
- ▶ **Assumption**: Higher the bond share ex-ante, larger the incentive to rebalance portfolio
- ▶ **Model**: Is it possible to show that the housing share adjustment (Δ) varies with ex-ante bond share? Dynamic setting?


* Corollary 1: $\frac{d\alpha_h}{db} \leq 0$, $\frac{d(\alpha_x + \alpha_b)}{db} \geq 0$

- ▶ Empirical check

$$\Delta bond_t = \alpha_t + \alpha_h + \beta Post_t \times Bonds_{h,2014} + \epsilon_{h,t}$$

Potential spatial "spillover" effect

- ▶ Concern about the interaction between treated and control households
 - * After QE, low-bond-share households sell their houses to high-bond-share neighbors
 - * Housing share \uparrow for the treated and \downarrow for the control
- ▶ The existence of such "spillover" effects may violate the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and bias the estimate



Regional outcome


- ▶ Additional exercises that might be useful
 - * Compare treated and controls for which there is likely to be very little probability of transaction
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 - * Compare treated and controls for which there is likely to be very little probability of transaction
 - * Formal method in Berg et al. (2021)
- ▶ (Differential) sorting by immigrants
Population, job opp., cost of living, education, regulation, ...
- ▶ Exogenous instruments to characterize the local housing market
 - * Physical (i.e., Saiz-type housing supply elasticity) or regulatory constraint
 - * Echo the assumption in the model: fixed house supply

Regional outcome

- ▶ Evidence on housing transaction volume?
- ▶ The large wave of immigrants in Germany started from 2012
 - * Would it make sense to exploit shares in later years (instead of 2008)



Summary

In sum

- ▶ Great paper furthering our understanding of QE transmission
- ▶ Very clear and carefully executed
- ▶ Open up many interesting new dimensions for research
- ▶ Recommend it to everyone and good luck with the publication!

Thank you!