

Discussion

Reserves Were Not So Ample After All

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of BIS.

Summary


- A great paper with rich information - monetary policy, regulation, monetary market stress, etc. Key messages are
 - Low reserve balances of + delayed intraday payments of reserves to repo-active large banks → repo rate spikes
 - A higher aggregate level of reserves would help eliminate repo market disruptions
- My discussion focuses on
 - September 2019 repo spike
 - A high aggregate level of reserves in practice

September 2019 Repo spike

Money market rates (%)






Cumulative change in Fed balance sheet(\$bn)



High level story: demand – supply imbalance

- Treasury issuance → demand ↑
- Corporate tax payment + Treasury issuance → TGA ↑ and reserve ↓ → supply ↓




- The demand and supply factors were at stretched but not extreme levels.
- small shift in demand/supply factors & large swing in price & stable volume
➔ inelastic demand and supply curve


- Why supply was inelastic?
- Large repo-active banks were reluctant to step in due to high regulation costs.
 - To avoid daylight overdraft: delayed intraday payments of reserves from other banks due to lower reserve balances of these banks (Copeland et al, 2022)
 - self-fulfilling expectations → amplification of shocks
 - To avoid expand balance sheet: a loss of ability of netting due to retrench of MMFs from sponsored repo (Afonso et al, 2020)

EXHIBIT 3
The Role of the CCP


- How about other players?
 - MMF
 - FHLB




Delayed intraday payments



Cumulative change in repo volumes (\$bn)



MMF Investments (\$bn)



Money market rates (%)



Ample reserve in practice

- Sufficiency
 - While the Fed can control the *aggregate* reserve level, it can not control the *distribution* of reserves.

- Costs
 - Interest rate expenses
 - Treasury market functioning
 - **Hysteresis effect (Avalos et al, 2019)**
 - depressed interbank trading activity in an abundant reserves regime → Norges Bank switched to a quote-based system in 2011

- Necessity
 - Other options such as SRF, more usage of discount window

