The Dual Local Markets: Family, Jobs, and the Spatial Distribution of Skills

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ABFER

Introduction

Motivation

- Job and family remain largely ‘local’
  - most live with their spouses and within commuting distances from their jobs
  - in choosing where to live, returns from both labor and marriage markets are considered
  - implications for the spatial distribution of economic activity?
- Two trends in the U.S. economy in the past half century
  - increasing disparities between skilled and less-skilled cities (”regional divergence”) evidence
  - declining marriage rate
  - Are these two phenomena related?

Decline of Marriage



Cohabitation Cohort Edu

Decline of Marriage: Across Cohort at a Given Age



Note: The dotted lines are projected rates based on rates of the previous cohort.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of the Decennial Census and American Community Surveys (ACS), IPUMS

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Research Question

- How do the local *labor* market and the local *marriage* market interact to shape the size and productivity of cities
- Do marriage market incentives make the spatial distribution of economic activities more or less concentrated?
  - How important are spillovers and general equilibrium effects?

This Paper

- Builds a spatial equilibrium model with endogenous marriage formation
  - labor and marriage market considerations jointly determine location choices, which in turn affect eqm returns in both markets
  - delivers a sufficient statistic for the marriage market premium of a city
- Calibrates the model to the U.S. spatial economy in 2000
  - the model matches the spatial heterogeneity in marriage outcomes well
  - counterfactuals find marriages to be a force of spatial dispersion, despite positive assortative matching. Endogenous marriage returns and GE important
- Accounting for the spatial divergence between 1960 and 2000
  - evaluate roles of declining share of married, changing social norm on working wife, narrowing gender pay gap, etc. (Greenwood et al., 2016, 2017)
  - reduced return from marriage accounts for up to a third of the spatial divergence over this period

Contributions

- Quantitative spatial GE models (e.g., Davis & Dingel, 2019; Fajgelbaum & Gaubert, 2020; reviewed by Redding & Rossi-Hansberg, 2017.)
  - Predominantly modeling *individual* choices
  - Contribution: Develop a tractable model with endogenous local marriage markets.
- Explaining the spatial divergence of U.S. economy (due to endogenous amenity (diamond, 2016); skill-biased tech. change (Giannone, 2017); housing supply (Hsieh & Moretti, 2019))
  - mostly descriptive evidence on marriage and spatial sorting (Costa & Kahn, 2000; Compton & Pollak, 2007), with exceptions (e.g., Alonzo, 2021)
  - Contribution: The declining marriage rate is quantitatively important in spatial divergence.
- Quantitative transferable utility marriage models (since Choo & Siow, 2006)
  - mostly do not have a spatial dimension
  - Contribution: Extend a workhorse matching model into a multi-region GE setting.

Spatial Heterogeneity in Local Marriage Markets

More Likely to Be Single in Skill-intensive Cities



Prob. of Unmarried

Note: Aged 25 and 54 in 2000 Census. MSA-level single rate by gender-skill adjusted for age and race. Marks show MSAs binned by log skill share.

Never Married by Age

More Women in Cities with Higher Gender Wage Gaps



Gender Ratio and *Pred.* Relative Wage

Note: Separately for full-time men and women, log earnings regressed on demographics, MSA FE, and industry-occupation FE. Avg ind-occ FEs within MSA indicates gender-specific labor demand.

- Predicted gender wage gaps driven by relative labor demand.
- *More* women in places with higher male wage, consistent with marriage-market considerations in migration (Edlund, 2005).

People migrate to cities with higher earnings gains from marriage

- gender wage gap for skill h/l: $\text{GWG}_i^e \equiv \log(w_i^{M,e}) - \log(w_i^{F,e})$
- gender marriage income gap for h/l: $\text{GMIG}_i^e \equiv \log(\mathbb{E}\text{hhd\_income}_i^{M,e}) - \log(\mathbb{E}\text{hhd\_income}_i^{F,e})$

Specification:

$$\text{gender difference in migration in i for skill e} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{GMIG}_i^e + \beta_2 \cdot \text{GWG}_i^e + \varepsilon_i$$

- def of gender difference in migration: (of net migration of men - of net migration of women)/(of people of the same skill in MSA)
- expect $\beta_1 > 0$

	gender difference in net-migration rate, 25-34 yo	
	(7)	(8)
Panel A: High-skilled		
gender wage gap	0.034	-0.063
	(0.030)	(0.064)
gender gap in hhd income	**0.031**	**0.230**
	(0.045)	(0.071)
model	OLS	2SLS
N	283	283
Panel B: Low-skilled		
gender gender wage gap	0.051	0.052
	(0.023)	(0.027)
gender gap in hhd income	**0.229**	**0.239**
	(0.025)	(0.036)
model	OLS	2SLS
N	283	283

Note: Data from 2000 Censuses. Each observation is an MSA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the gender difference in net-migration rate among the 25-34 year old, separately for the high-skilled and the low-skilled. It is calculated as (# of net migration of men - # of net migration of women)/(# of people of the same skill in MSA).

Model

Model: Rosen-Roback Meets Becker

- N cities, indexed by d
  - cities differ in *exogenous* components of amenities and productivity, land supply shifter and elasticity
  - agglomeration forces change the endogenous component of amenities, productivity, and rent.
- Young adults choose city
- People in a city participate in the local marriage market
  - (e, e') denote a couple: e the skill of the husband and e' that of the wife
  - singles: $(e, \emptyset)$ or $(\emptyset, e')$
  - 8 household types

Utility for Singles and Couples

- $\overline{V}_d^{(e,e')}$: the expected utility of household type (e, e') in d
- A couple with a man ω of skill e and a woman ω' of skill e' has unitary household utility: $\overline{V}_d^{(e,e')} + \xi_M^{e,e'}(\omega) + \xi_F^{e,e'}(\omega')$
  - $\xi_M^{e,e'}(\omega)$ and $\xi_F^{e,e'}(\omega')$ idisocynratic taste of the spouses for outcome (e, e')
  - household utility will be split between ω and ω' if they form a couple
  - the exact split depends on the outside option of the two partners
- Utility of ω if remaining single is $\overline{V}_d^{(e,\varnothing)} + \xi_M^{e,\varnothing}(\omega)$
- Utility of ω' if remaining single is $\overline{V}_d^{(\varnothing,e')} + \xi_F^{\varnothing,e'}(\omega')$

Stable Match in City d

- Given the demographic composition of city d and V, the outcome of the marriage market in city d is a stable match that prescribes who matches with whom, and the distribution of utility: such that
  - Utility of ω: $u_{d,M}^{e,e'}(\omega) = U_{d,M}^{e,e'} + \xi_M^{e,e'}(\omega) = \max_{e'' \in \{H,L,\emptyset\}}[U_{d,M}^{e,e''} + \xi_M^{e,e''}(\omega)]$
  - 'No money left on table'

$$U_{d,M}^{e,e'} + U_{d,F}^{e,e'} = \overline{V}_d^{e,e'} \quad (4\ eqs)$$
$$U_{d,M}^{e,\varnothing} = \overline{V}_d^{e,\varnothing} \quad (2\ eqs)$$
$$U_{d,F}^{\varnothing,e'} = \overline{V}_d^{\varnothing,e'} \quad (2\ eqs)$$

  - no excess demand for each type of marriage (4 eqs)

Location and partner choice of young adults

- The expected utility of ω of type (M, e) from city d

$$\overline{U}^{e}_{d,M} = \mathbb{E} \max_{e' \in \{H,L,\emptyset\}} [U^{(e,e')}_{d,M} + \xi^{e,e'}_{M}(\omega)]$$

- Similarly, for a women of skill e':

$$\overline{U}^{e'}_{d,F} = \mathbb{E} \max_{e \in \{H,L,\emptyset\}} [U^{(e,e')}_{d,F} + \xi^{e,e'}_{F}(\omega)]$$

- Parametric assumption: $\vec{\xi}^{e}_{M}(\omega) \equiv \left(\xi^{e,H}_{M}(\omega), \xi^{e,L}_{M}(\omega), \xi^{e,\varnothing}_{M}(\omega)\right)$ i.i.d. from a Gumbel distribution with parameter κ^{e}_{M}

The Marriage Market Premia of Cities

$$\overline{U}^{e}_{d,M} = \frac{\gamma}{\kappa^e_M} + \underbrace{\overline{V}^{e,\varnothing}_{d}}_{\text{utility if single}} \overbrace{- \frac{1}{\kappa^e_M} \log(\underbrace{r^{e,\varnothing}_{d,M}}_{\text{single rate}})}^{\text{the marriage market premium of d}}$$

- Fixing $\overline{V}^{e,\varnothing}_{d}$, higher $r^{e,\varnothing}_{d,M} \implies$ marriages relatively less attractive in $d \implies$ marriage incentive less important a reason for people to choose d
- Implications
  - captures the marriage market premia of cities
  - the change in $\overline{U}^{e}_{d,M}$ when single rate is set to 1: $-\frac{1}{\kappa^e_M}\log(1) + \frac{1}{\kappa^e_M}\log(r^{e,\varnothing}_{d,M})$
  - Skilled intensive cities have higher single rates $\Rightarrow$ marriage is a **dispersion** force in PE

Remaining Household Decisions

- Singles
  - Indirect utility given by

$$\overline{V}^{e}_{d,s} \equiv \max_{h,n} \log\left(A^{e}_{d} \cdot (I^{e}_{d,s} - r_d \cdot h - p_n \cdot n)^{(1-\alpha-\beta)} \cdot h^{\alpha} \cdot n^{\beta}\right).$$

  where A^{s}_{d} is amenities; $I^{e}_{d,s}$ is income (earnings + transfer); h is housing consumption and r_d rent; n is home goods consumption and p_n its market price

- Couples
  - the wife obtains idisocynratic ζ^H and ζ^W (for home production and work)

$$\tilde{V}^{e,e'}_{d}(\zeta^H, \zeta^W) = \delta^{e,e'} +$$
$$\max_{H,W}\left\{\zeta^W + \max_{h,n} \log\left(A^{e,e'}_{d}(I^{e,e'}_{d,W} - r_d h - p_n n)^{(1-\alpha-\beta)} h^{\alpha} n^{\beta}\right),\right.$$
$$\left.\zeta^H + \max_{h} \log\left(A^{e,e'}_{d}(I^{e,e'}_{d,H} - r_d h)^{(1-\alpha-\beta)} h^{\alpha} (\bar{n}^{e'})^{\beta}\right)\right\}$$

What Is a Marriage?

- A unitary household utility function, with household amenities, ($A_d^{e,e'} = (A_d^e A_d^{e'})^{1/2}$) and household-level budget
- The option of having a stay at home spouse, captured by $\bar{n}^e$
- Love ($\delta^{e,e'}$): as a residual to match the number of the four types of marriages

Closing the Model

- Amenities and city productivity
  - Exogenous: $\bar{A}_d^e$ and $\bar{K}_d^e$
  - Endogenous: agglomeration for amenities $(\sigma_{e,e'})$ and productivity $(\gamma_{e,e'})$
- Housing market: shifter $\bar{H}_d$ and return to scale $\epsilon_d < 1$. Profit paid back to household in lump sump t
- Gender wage gap: effective wage for women a β^e fraction of men
- Equilibrium definition: agents optimize, labor/good/housing/marriage clear, expectation consistent with reality

Parameterization and Model Validation

Parameters	Descriptions	Value	Targets/Source
A. Assigned directly			
$\sigma_{e,e'}$	amenity spillovers	$\sigma_{H,H} = 0.77,\ \sigma_{H,L} = 0.18,$ $\sigma_{L,H} = -1.24,\ \sigma_{L,L} = -0.43$	Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2020)
$\gamma_{e,e'}$	prod. spillovers	$\gamma_{H,H} = 0.05,\ \gamma_{H,L} = 0.04,$ $\gamma_{L,H} = 0.02,\quad \gamma_{L,L} = 0.003$	Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2020)
ρ	substitution between skills	0.392	Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2020)
β_F^e	gender wage gap	$\beta_F^H = 0.76, \beta_F^L = 0.74$	2000 Census
α	housing share	0.25	2000 Census
β	home-good share	0.2	
ϵ_d	housing supply elast.	Figure 2	Diamond (2016)
θ_s^e	income elast. of migration	$\theta_M^H = \theta_F^H = 4.98,$ $\theta_M^L = \theta_F^L = 3.26$	Diamond (2016)
B. Estimated independently			
η_F^e	labor force participation.	Table 1	2000 Census
κ_s^e	marriage taste shock	Table 2, column 3	2000 Census
$\tau_{b,s}^e$	migration cost	Table 4	2000 Census
C. Calibrated jointly			
$\bar{H}_d$	housing supply shifter	-	rent by city
$\bar{A}_d^e$	fund. amenities	-	emp by city $\times$ skill
$\bar{K}_d^e$	fund. prod.	-	wage by city $\times$ skill
$\delta^{e,e'}$	love	$\delta^{H,H} = 1.07,\ \delta^{H,L} = 0.28,$ $\delta^{L,H} = -1.96,\ \delta^{L,L} = 1.20$	68% people in marriages; composition: 21% (H,H), 13% (H,L), 9% (L,H), 56% (L,L)
$\bar{n}^e$	home prod. pref.	$\bar{n}^H = 0.004,\ \ \bar{n}^L = 1.03$	labor force participation (83% and 73%)

Model validation

Counterfactuals

The PE and GE Effects of Eliminating Marriages

- PE: Set $r^{d,M}_{e,\varnothing}$ and $r^{d,F}_{\varnothing,e'}$ (single rate) to 1, while holding utility of being single unchanged
- GE: Set $\delta^{e,e'}$ (non-economic return of a match) to sufficient negative



PE versus GE: City Size



PE versus GE: Log Skill Ratio

Comparison Between 1960 and 2000 Economy

- Increasing skill share
- Declining marriage
- Increasing LFP among married women

	2000		1960	
	Target	Parameter	Target	Parameter
Demographics	15% (M,H), 34% (M,L), 14% (F,H), 36% (F,L)	-	5.7% (M,H),43% (M,L), 3.5% (F,H), 48% (F,L)	-
Marriage patterns	68% people married: HH (21%), HL (13%), LH(9%), LL (56%)	$\delta^{H,H} = 1.06$, $\delta^{H,L} = 0.28$, $\delta^{L,H} = -1.96$, $\delta^{L,L} = 1.20$	83% people married: HH (4%), HL (8%), LH(3%), LL (85%)	$\delta^{H,H} = 1.24$, $\delta^{H,L} = 1.72$, $\delta^{L,H} = -2.13$, $\delta^{L,L} = 3.98$
Gender wage gap	24% for H, 26% for L	$\beta_F^H = 0.76$, $\beta_F^L = 0.74$	36% for H, 38% for L	$\beta_F^H = 0.64$, $\beta_F^L = 0.62$
LFP of married women	83% among H, 73% among L	$\bar{n}^H = 0.004$, $\bar{n}^L = 1.03$	58% among H, 46% among L	$\bar{n}^H = 0.62$, $\bar{n}^L = 2.19$

Changing Marriage Institution and Spatial Divergence

	Model				Data
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	home production $(p_n, \bar{n}^e)$	gender wage gap (β_F^e)	non-econ. return $(\delta^{e,e'})$	all together	
skill gradient	0.003	0.001	0.028	0.054	0.14
population gradient	0.015	0.003	0.11	0.20	0.33

- Declining non-economic returns of marriage account for 20-30% of the spatial divergence
- Marriage-related model elements accounts for 30-60%

Conclusions

Conclusions

- A new quantitative spatial equilibrium model with endogenous marriage formation
  - a sufficient statistic for the PE impacts of the secular change in marriage
  - tractable quantitative GE analysis
- An application to the U.S. finds
  - marriage is a dispersion force and first-order determinant of the spatial distribution of economic activities
  - changing marriage institution is an important factor driving changes in spatial economics

Decline of Marriage: Not due to Increasing Cohabitation

% of population ages 25 to 54 who are ...



Note: Unpartnered adults are those who are neither married nor living with an unmarried partner.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 1990 and 2000 decennial census and 2010 and 2019 American Community Survey (IPUMS).
"Rising Share of U.S. Adults Are Living Without a Spouse or Partner"

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Decline of Marriage: Across Education Groups

Education and Marriage: Shifting Patterns for Women and Men

% of men and women ages 25 and older who have never been married, by education



Source: Pew Research Center analysis of the 1960-2000 decennial censuses and 2010-2012 American Community Survey, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)

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More Never-married people in Skill-intensive Cities



Prob. of Never Married

Note: Aged 25 and 54 in 2000 Census. MSA-level never-married rate by gender-skill adjusted for age and race. Marks show MSAs binned by log skill share.

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Shares of Unmarried by Age in Skill-intensive and Less Skill-intensive Cities



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Changing Marriage Institution and Spatial Divergence



Change in City Size: Model

Changing Marriage Institution and Spatial Divergence



Change in Skill Intensity: Model

Gumbel Parameter in Wife's LFP: η_F^e

$$\log\left(\frac{l_d^{e,e'}}{1-l_d^{e,e'}}\right) = \eta_F^{e'} \cdot [\log(l_{d,W}^{e,e'}) - \log(l_{d,H}^{e,e'})] + f(\hat{p}_n, \hat{n}^{e'}) + \lambda^{e,e'} + \varepsilon_d^{e,e'}.$$

	(1)	(2)
	$e' = H$	$e' = L$
$\log(l_{d,W}^{e,e'}) - \log(l_{d,H}^{e,e'})$	0.866	3.334
	(0.407)	(0.400)
Controls		
log rent	X	X
% having young children	X	X
distr. of husband age	X	X
Household type FE	X	X
	$(H,H),(L,H)$	$(H,L),(L,L)$
N	653	654

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Gumbel Parameter for Idiosyncratic Marital Pref.: κ_s^e

$$\log(q_d^{H,H}) = g(\mathbf{X}_d^{H,H}) + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa_M^H} + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^H}}[\alpha \log(r_d) + \frac{1}{\kappa_M^H}\log(q_d^{H,\emptyset}) + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^H}\log(q_d^{\emptyset,H})] + \varepsilon_d^{H,H}$$

$$\log(q_d^{H,L}) = g(\mathbf{X}_d^{H,L}) + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa_M^H} + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^L}}[\alpha \log(r_d) + \frac{1}{\kappa_M^H}\log(q_d^{H,\emptyset}) + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^L}\log(q_d^{\emptyset,L})] + \varepsilon_d^{H,L}$$

$$\log(q_d^{L,H}) = g(\mathbf{X}_d^{L,H}) + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa_M^L} + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^H}}[\alpha \log(r_d) + \frac{1}{\kappa_M^L}\log(q_d^{L,\emptyset}) + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^H}\log(q_d^{\emptyset,H})] + \varepsilon_d^{L,H}$$

$$\log(q_d^{L,L}) = g(\mathbf{X}_d^{L,L}) + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa_M^L} + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^L}}[\alpha \log(r_d) + \frac{1}{\kappa_M^L}\log(q_d^{L,\emptyset}) + \frac{1}{\kappa_F^L}\log(q_d^{\emptyset,L})] + \varepsilon_d^{L,L}.$$

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	(1)	(2)	(3)
κ_M^H	2.37	1.84	1.62
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.40)
κ_F^H	2.13	1.64	1.66
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.47)
κ_M^L	1.21	0.87	0.71
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.24)
κ_F^L	5.13	3.53	2.61
	(1.39)	(1.08)	(0.91)
$\log(\frac{I_d^{e,e'}}{I_{d,M}^e \cdot I_{d,F}^{e'}})$	X	X	X
$\log(I_d^{e,e'})$	X	X	X
$\hat{p}_n$	X	X	X
$\log(\hat{A}_d)$			
climate		X	X
services			X
N	1181	1181	1181

Migration cost: $d^{o}_{od,s}$

- Parameterize migration cost by distance bins

$$d^{e}_{od,s} = \mathbb{I}_{S(o)\neq S(d)} \cdot \sum_{b=1}^{5} \tau^{e}_{b,s} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{b}$$

- Combining with migration flow function

$$\log(N^{e}_{od,s}) = \lambda^{e}_{o,s} + \lambda^{e}_{d,s} - \theta^{e}_{s} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{S(o)\neq S(d)} \cdot \sum_{b=1}^{5} \tau^{e}_{b,s} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{b} + \varepsilon^{e}_{od,s},$$

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	male		female	
dep var: $\log(N^e_{od,s})$	high	low	high	low
$\theta^e_s \cdot \tau^e_{1,s}$	1.870	2.224	1.957	2.148
	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.114)	(0.141)
$\theta^e_s \cdot \tau^e_{2,s}$	2.621	3.312	2.713	3.260
	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.061)
$\theta^e_s \cdot \tau^e_{3,s}$	3.510	4.315	3.638	4.280
	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.058)
$\theta^e_s \cdot \tau^e_{4,s}$	4.025	4.888	4.161	4.868
	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.058)
$\theta^e_s \cdot \tau^e_{5,s}$	4.346	5.378	4.529	5.365
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.060)
destination MSA FE ($\lambda^e_{d,s}$)	X	X	X	X
state-of-origin FE ($\lambda^e_{o,s}$)	X	X	X	X
N	11099	13529	11436	13586

Value of Marriage Market Options in Location Choices



Gender Ratio and Relative Wage

Note: Aged 25 and 54 in 2000 Census. Log gender wage gap is calculated from full-time workers and is adjusted for age, race, and detailed education levels.

- The flat relation is at odds with workhorse spatial equilibrium models
- Consistent with marriage prospects affecting location choices

Regional Divergence: Skilled Cities Grew Faster



Note: 5% sample of 1960 and 2000 population censuses. Each circle represents an MSA. The size of the circle corresponds to the size of the working age population. H/L is the employment skill ratio.

Regional Divergence: Skilled Cities Grew Even More Skilled



Note: 5% sample of 1960 and 2000 population censuses. Each circle represents an MSA. The size of the circle corresponds to the size of the working age population. H/L is the employment skill ratio.

Model Validation: Gender Composition of Skills

- Calibration targets skill share (H/L) in each city, but not the *gender composition* of skills in each city





Log Relative Skill Ratio: Model — Data

Vertical axis: $\log(\frac{\text{\# of high skill women}}{\text{\# of low skill women}}) - \log(\frac{\text{\# of high skill men}}{\text{\# of low skill men}})$.

Model Validation: Composition of Households

- Calibration targets the composition of marriages in the aggregate, but not by city



Married Hhds: Model



Data



Single Hhds: Model



Data

Utility in Different Marriage Outcomes ($U_{d,s}^{e,e'}$)



High-skill Men High-skill Women

- utility for both the single and the married increases with skill intensity, but the former increases faster
- marrying an H may be more attractive than other outcomes on average, but the premium decreases with skill intensity, so the single rate increases
- underscores the importance of endogenous marital surplus and its division