Investments that Make our Homes Greener: The Role of Regulation

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Summary

- Research question: evaluation of a regulation in UK that requires some rented properties to satisfy minimum energy efficiency standards
 - Energy efficiency—policy target
 - Capex and the financial return, rent, carbon emission
- Importance
 - Major source of energy consumption and carbon emission
 - Underinvestment in energy saving among private rental properties: landlord-tenant agency problem



Summary (cont.)

- Universe of Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) records
 - Measure of overall energy efficiency (energy running costs): SAP points
 - Description of the property element—identify retrofits
 - Carbon emission of the property (Environment impact, or EI points)
- Policy intervention
 - Minimum level of energy efficiency (i.e., SAP>=39) for private rental properties
 - Owner-occupied properties not affected
 - Approval date: 2015:03; Implementation date: 2018:04




Summary (cont.)

- Policy compliance: energy efficiency gain
 - Bunching of SAP among rental properties right at 39, only after the policy
 - Conditional on a new SAP, low-score rental properties show a greater energy efficiency improvement than low-score owner-occupied properties
- Investment response
 - Lower capex retrofits (e.g., low-energy LED lighting)
- Rental listing price increase by 1%
 - Can only cover low capex retrofits
- Little/negative improvements in carbon emission
 - Reduction in electricity use: more pecuniary than emission benefits



Bunching around the threshold





10a. Fuel costs – Individual heating systems including micro-CHP			
	Fuel	Fuel price	Fuel cost
Cases heating and sustain 4	kWh/year	(Table 12)	£/year
Space heating - main system 1	(211) ×	× 0.01 =	(240)
Space heating - main system 2	(213) ×	× 0.01 =	(241)
Space heating - secondary	(215) _×	× 0.01 =	(242)
Water heating (electric off-peak tariff)			
High-rate fraction (Table 13, or Appen	dix F for electric CPSU)	(243)	
Low-rate fraction	1.0 – (243) = (244)	
High-rate cost	(219)× (243) ×	× 0.01 =	(245)
Low-rate cost	(219)× (244) ×	× 0.01 =	(246)
Water heating cost (other fuel)	(219) ×	× 0.01 =	(247)
(for a DHW-only community scheme use (3	42a) or (342b) instead of (247)		
Space cooling	(221) ×	× 0.01 =	(248)
Pumps, fans and electric keep-hot	(231) ×	× 0.01 =	(249)
(if off-peak tariff, list each of (230a) to (230g) separately as applicable and apply fuel price according to Table 12a			
Energy for lighting	(232) ×	× 0.01 =	(250)
Additional standing charges (Table 12)			(251)
Energy saving/generation technologies <description></description>	(233) to (235a) as applicable, repe one of (233) to (235a)		(252)
Appendix Q items: repeat lines (253) an		×	(202)
<description>, energy saved</description>	one of (236a) etc ×	× 0.01 =	(253)
<description>, energy used</description>	one of (237a) etc ×	× 0.01 =	(254)
Total energy cost		(240)(242) + (245)(254) =	(255)
· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		(2.0)(2.2) (2.0)(20.)	
11a. SAP rating – Individual heating systems including micro-CHP			
Energy cost deflator (Table 12):			0.42 (256)
Energy cost factor (ECF)		[(255) × (256)] ÷ [(4) + 45.0] =	(257)
SAP rating (Section 13)			(258)



Bunching around the threshold

- Very complicated data-collection procedure and formular
 - Involves log transformation
- Hard to be accurately predicted by landlords
 - Room for appraiser manipulation
- May help explain the gap between SAP and carbon response
 - El is not the direct target of the policy-no incentive to manipulate
 - Policy implication: design and enforcement



Bunching around the threshold

- Some direct evidence may be helpful
 - Higher incidence of bunching if the retrofit involve items easier to be manipulated by nature?
 - Labor market competition of appraisers
 - "Relationship" appraisals?
 - Clustering of bunching among certain appraisers?
- Weaker EI improvements relative to SAP in this case?



Response of rents

- Imperfect pass-through of landlords' capital expenditure
 - Esp those that involve big-ticket items
- Better passthrough: SAP as a (credible) signal?
 - Are SAP disclosed in the listing description?
- More heterogeneity analysis to understand the distributional effect
 - E.g., proxies for landlord and tenants' income level
 - Or by the type of retrofits



Response of rents

- The policy targets properties on the left tail of SAP distribution
 - Presumably, on the left tail of other dimensions as well

- Does investment on energy efficiency crowd out (in) expenditure on other facilities?
 - Hedonic-quality-adjusted rents may be even higher
 - Description in the listing?



Response of energy efficiency

- Ideally, track the energy efficiency and CO2 emission of the same building overtime
 - SAP and EI observable only in the case of an EPC update
- Main results: intensive margin response
 - Conditional on an EPC update, how does Δ evolve over time
- Extensive margin: treated properties are more likely to perform retrofits after the policy shock
 - Underestimation of the total treatment effect




Response of energy efficiency

- A balanced panel of SAP and EI
 - Fill the scores between two certificates as the value of the previous one
 - Assumption: EPCs are updated in a timely manner
 - Likely to be true for rental properties, but not owner occupied
- An alternative control group:
 - Rental properties with pre-event SAP scores (just) above 39



Response of energy efficiency





Concluding Remarks

- Important paper answering an urgent question
 - Very rich results that offer new insights

- Well-executed and well-written
 - Enjoyed reading this paper and learned a lot!

• Looking forward to seeing the published version on a top journal

