

Comments on "The Law and Economics of Lawyers: Evidence from the Revolving Door in China's Judicial System*"

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*In the US!

WHEN I THINK THUS OF THE LAW. I SEE A PRINCESS MIGHTIER THAN SHE WHO ONCE WROUGHT AT BA-YEUX, ETERNALLY WEAVING INTO HER WEB DIM FIGURES OF THE EVER-LENGTHENING PAST--FIGURES TOO DIM TO BE NOTICED BY THE IDLE TOO SYMBOLIC TO BE INTERPRETE EXCEPT BY HER PUPILS, BUT TO TH DISCERNING EYE DISCLOSING EVEN

Overall take

- This is a super-interesting paper!
- Remarkable data huge, comprehensive, interesting
- Really clear discussion of Chinese legal system (which I knew 0 about) & judges' careers
- I really like the way the paper takes seriously economic theories & their connection to law
- Now let me get to some details



Observation 1: Incredible Data!



- Amazingly large data set: ~universe of judgments
- Size makes it possible to identify off teeny set of lawyers
- Side note: US has nothing like this—I'm teaching a course this semester about limited nature of public access in US



Conceptual Issues



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Big picture issue: Settlement

- A key problem in using judgment data to learn about legal system is settlement
- If cases can settle, then set of cases that litigate to judgment is selected
 - Famous paper by Priest & Klein 1984 *Journal of Legal Studies*
 - More recent work, including my own (Gelbach 2018 *Journal of Law & Economics*)
- Today's paper doesn't say anything about settlement
 - Does it happen at all?
 - If so, are we seeing only non-settled cases?
 - That could be a real challenge: which cases are tried is unlikely to be accidental.



Details: How Well Does the Model Match the Data?

• In the model, judgments are binary

- Plaintiff wins or defendant wins
- No middle ground

• But the data seem to be defined in a continuous way

- Party win share is opponent's share of court cost divided by total court cost
- Does this mismatch matter?



Which facts matter?

• Facts can be observed and unobserved

- Part of what makes paper convincing is case groups conditioning on facts of disputes
- For example, monetary size of the loan, interest rate, duration of repayment
- Does conditioning on such details render cases "identical from a legal perspective"?
- If so why *are* there disputes, and lawsuits?
 - Presumably there are other, unobserved facts?
 - What about question of whether a contract was signed, or whether payment was made?
 - So, there remain unobservables hope is that they aren't somehow correlated with RD variation



What kind of information do good lawyers provide?

- The paper's third motivation presumes that the information lawyers provide is <u>good</u>
- But what if that's wrong sometimes?
 - Good lawyers might be good partly because they use evidence rules well
 - And evidence rules (at least in the US) are about <u>excluding relevant</u> evidence
 - Etc.
- Conceptually, this suggests that dispersion isn't the only social "bad": sometimes bad information is the result of good lawyers



Empirical Comments



More sample information would be good

- The paper is very early-stage, but need more info on how full set of cases gets whittled down
 - For example, to avoid bad matches, only lawyers with very unusual last names used
 - Does this matter? How might we tell?
 - Also, only sales and loan contract cases involved (crim in apx); what share are these?
 - And of course, the settlement question



Some interesting issues in results

1.

2.

→

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Defendant's Win Rate		Plaintiff's Win Rate	
		Loan Contract	Sales Contract	Loan Contract	Sales Contract
	Panel A Baseline				
. Different effects	Revolving Door Lawyer	0.020***	0.066***	0.091***	0.067***
(but maybe not?)		(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.021)
(But maybe not.)	% in mean	11%	15%	11%	11%
. Different N	Obs.	(334,491)	173,209	763,627	330,128
	R-squared	0.349	0.319	0.402	0.358
Different Cases	Case Group FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Year FE	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
	Court FE	Y	Y	Υ	Υ

Table 1: Revolving Door Lawyers' Impact on Court Rulings



Table 2: Revolving

	10010 _ 1001011.00			
Know-How		(1)	(2)	
			Defendan	
		Loan Contract		
	Panel A: "know how"-	v"– cases in away courts		
	RD Lawyer	0.015***	0.014^{***}	
		(0.003)	(0.004)	
	$RD \times Diff.$ Prov.		0.003	
	$RD \times Diff. Regions$		$\begin{array}{c}(0.007)\\0.005\end{array}$	
	RD × Diil. Regions		(0.005)	
Why not use one	Obs.	231,913	231,913	
specification?	R-squared	0.219	0.231	
	Panel B: "know how"– capability indicators			
	RD Lawyer	0.015***	0.016***	
		(0.005)	(0.004)	
	RD \times Grad. Degree	0.010^{**}		
	$RD \times Same domain$	(0.005)	0.011**	
			(0.005)	
	Obs.	280,564	269,725	
	R-squared	0.262	0.247 K	
	Case Group FE	Y	Y	

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Really interesting paper!

- It needs a bit of polishing empirically
- Issue of settlement is my only really substantive concern
- But leaving that issue aside, the paper is a really nice blend of theory and empirics



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