Annual Conference
|
Health Economics
|
May 2026
The VIP Effect in Medicine: How Patients' Insider Knowledge, Social Ties, and Organizational Rank Shapes Clinical Decisions
Very Important Persons (VIPs) often receive preferential treatment across many settings. We study how patients’ privileged traits, including insider knowledge, social ties to physicians, and organizational authority, drive physicians’ clinical decision-making. We leverage a policy reform that alters physicians’ financial incentives without affecting patient-physician matching. Using 100% insurance claim data from a major Chinese provincial capital city, we separately examine how physicians’ responses vary by patients’ privileged traits. We show that a policy eliminating physician profits from drug sales reduces drug utilization but increases the use of other forms of care, raising overall costs without improving patient health. These responses are strongest for non-insider patients (those not working in a healthcare institution) and attenuate by comparable magnitudes at each step along the social proximity gradient: from non-insiders to insiders outside the treating hospital and to insiders within the treating hospital. However, the responses diminish only modestly between low-rank and high-rank colleagues within the same hospital. These findings suggest that preferential access to efficient care operates primarily through insider knowledge and social ties, rather than organizational rank.
Keywords:
information, social ties, organizational rank, physician behavior, financial incentives